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On the Origins of O riginalism
Jamal Greene†

Abstract
For all its proponents’ claims of its necessity as a means of
constraining judges, originalism is remarkably unpopular outside the United
States. Recommended responses to judicial activism in other countries more
typically take the form of minimalism or textualism. This Article considers why. I
focus particular attention on the political and constitutional histories of Canada
and Australia, nations that, like the United States, have well-established
traditions of judicial enforcement of a written constitution, and that share with the
United States a common -law adjudicative norm, but whose judicial cultures less
readily assimilate judicial restraint to constitutional historicism. I offer six
hypotheses as to the influences that sensitize our popular and judicial culture to
such historicism: the canonizing influence of time; the revolutionary character of
American sovereignty; the rights revolution of the Warren and Burger Courts; the
politicization of the judicial nomination process in the United States; the
accommodation of an assimilative, as against a pluralist, ethos; and a relatively
evangelical religious culture. These six hypotheses suggest, among other things,
that originalist argument in the United States is a form of ethical argument, and
that the domestic debate over originalism should be understood in ethical terms.
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I. Introduction
For the last quarter-century originalism has been the idiom of judicial
restraint in the United States. Originalism’s proponents defend it as uniquely
appropriate to judging in a constitutional democracy because, unlike its
competitors, originalism offers articulable and transparent criteria for discerning
the meaning of ambiguous constitutional texts. Without the discipline originalism
enforces, judges are free to decide cases according to metrics that are either
impermissible—their naked policy preferences, say —or too opaque to impose the
public accountability the judicial role demands.
Despite sustained criticism that has discredited originalists within certain
corners of the legal academy, the originalism movement is a success by numerous
measures.1 As others have remarked, the Court’s recent decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller2 was less interesting for its result, which was widely
anticipated, than for the fact that Justice Stevens’s lengthy dissent spent so much
space parsing the views of eighteenth -century Americans on the meaning of the
Second Amendment’s text.3 As Part II of this Article details, originalism is a
recurring topic of discussion in newspaper editorials, on blogs, on talk radio, and
at confirmation hearings, and consistently large numbers of Americans report in
surveys that they believe Supreme Court Justices should interpret the Constitution
solely based on the original intentions of its authors.4
In light of the claims to singular democratic legitimacy made on
originalism’s behalf, and given the evident sympathies of many Americans
toward those claims, it is curious that originalism is so little celebrated outside the
United States. The notion that the meaning of a political constitution is fixed at
some point in the past and is authoritative in present cases is pooh -poohed by
most leading jurists in Canada, South Africa, India, Israel, and throughout most of

1

See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEORGETOW N L.J. 657 (2009).
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (establishing an individual constitutional right to keep a loaded handgun
in one’s home).
3
See id . at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism:
Heller as Griswold, 122 HAR V. L. RE V . 246, 250 (2008); Heller on a First Read, Posting of Dale
Carpenter to the Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1214514180.shtml (June 26, 2008
5:03 p.m. EST); Some Preliminary Reflections on Heller, Posting of Sandy Levinson to
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/some-preliminary-reflections-on-heller.html
(June 26, 2008 5:47 p.m. EST); More on Heller, Posting of Mark Tushnet to Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/more-on-heller.html (June 27, 2008 9:57 a.m. EST); cf.
Greene, supra note 1, at 686-88 (noting that Justice Stevens’s opinion was not originalist in the
same sense as Justice Scalia’s).
4
See Greene, supra note 1, at 695-96.
2
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Europe, and the text-bound “original meaning” version of originalism that has
been ascendant in recent years in the United States is on the wane in Australia.
The global rejection of American -style originalism would be
understandable if constitutional judges in other democratic countries either were
ignorant of originalism’s claims to judicial restraint or were discouraged from
such restraint altogether, but neither is true. The charge of judicial activism is
neither unique to nor uniquely stigmatic within American constitutional
discourse,5 and for all the hostility many originalists show toward importing
foreign jurisprudence into American constitutional interpretation, the domestic
originalism movement has not been reticent in seeking to export itself abroad.6
That so many American judges, theorists, and ordinary citizens take originalism
so seriously seems all the more curious in light of the advanced age of the U.S.
Constitution. Few constitutional framers or ratifiers are less connected to
contemporary realities than our own, and yet few peoples more earnestly or
enthusiastically engage originalist constitutional premises than we do. It may be
the genius of the U.S. Constitution that its text so graciously adapts to changing
circumstances,7 but it is a genius that many originalists conspicuously refuse to
recognize.
Our relative embrace of originalism is not easily explained as a corollary
either to the age of our Constitution, which at first blush seems to cut the other
way, or its commitment to writing, which is no longer unique. Nor do we find
obvious answers in our politics. Rights revolutions of the sort that the originalism
movement is responsive to have proceeded more quickly and more dramatically
elsewhere, and yet opposition movements in those societies have not turned to
historical meaning as a source of constitutional restoration.8 Foreign legal cultures
tend rather to express objections to judicially engineered constitutional change in
terms of either minimalism or legalism, recalling the erstwhile American
alternatives of prudentialism and “neutral principles.” 9

5

See, e.g., KEN T RO ACH , THE SUP REM E COUR T ON TR IAL : JUD ICIAL AC TIVISM OR DEM OCR ATIC
DIALOGUE ? (2001); Elke Luise Barnstedt, Judicial Activism in the Practice of the German Federal
Constitutional Court: Is the GFCC an Activist Court? , 13 JURIDIC A IN T’L 38 (2007); Michael
Kirby, Judicial Activism? A Riposte to the Counter-Reformation , 24 AUS TR . B AR RE V. 1 (2004).
6
See infra note 67 and accompanying text; cf. Greg Craven, Original Intent and the Australian
Constitution —Coming Soon to a Court Near You? , 1 PUB . L. RE V. 166, 166 (1990) (“No one with
a serious interest in constitutional law and theory could fail to be aware of the debate that has
raged in the United States over the question of ‘original intent’ (or ‘intentionalism’) as a theory for
the interpretation of that country’s Constitution.”).
7
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
8
See Jack M. Balkin, Originalism and Constitutional Redemption , 24 CONST. COM M . 427, 506
(2007).
9
Compare ALEX ANDER BICKEL , THE LE AS T D ANGE ROUS BR ANCH 111-98 (1962), with Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law , 73 HARV . L. RE V. 1 (1959).
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This all raises a strong inference that originalism is not culturally neutral;
that is, whether originalism “takes” appears to depend less on it than on us. If true,
recognition that affinity for originalism is culturally contingent could have two
salutary effects. First, it could go some way toward debunking the claim, still
advanced by many of originalism’s defenders, that originalist interpretation
inheres in judicially enforced written constitutionalism. Second, it could go even
further toward determining the best use of the considerable energy now devoted
either to originalism’s defeat or to its appropriation for progressive ends.
Turning the inference into a conclusion is challenging, however. We have
no access to a parallel-universe United States in which most relevant variables
save an embrace of originalism are held constant. Nonetheless, we do have, in
Canada and Australia, two foreign legal regimes that are in many key respects
comparable to our own.10 Like the United States, Canada and Australia are stable,
liberal democracies with independent judiciaries, well-established traditions of
judicial review, and written constitutions of long standing relative to most of the
world’s. Moreover, all three countries have common -law legal regimes derived
from British practice, and so seem more likely than civil-law countries to
approach statutory and constitutional interpretation using the evolutionary and
judge-empowering methods generally disfavored by originalists.11 Any
explanations for divergence between American attitudes toward constitutional
historicism and those of Canadians and Australians cannot readily count on the
“writtenness” of the U.S. Constitution, its enforcement by independent and
unaccountable judges, or the necessity of checking a judiciary accustomed to the
creativity that common -law adjudication affords.
As Part III demonstrates, in neither Canada nor Australia is the language
of judicial restraint historicist. In Canada, the metaphor of a “living tree”
dominates constitutional judicial practice and scholarship; objections to “activist”
decisions are more typically framed as errors of application than errors of method.
As in much of Europe, Canadian constitutional interpretation is unapologetically,
and for the most part uncontroversially, teleological. The same cannot be said of
Australia, whose constitutional jurisprudence is self-consciously “originalist” to a
degree unknown in the United States and unimaginable in Canada. Significantly,
10

Here, then, I emplo y a “most similar cases” approach to comparative constitutional law. See Ran
Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law , 53 AM . J. COM P . L.
125 (2005).
11
See AN TONIN SC AL IA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A M ATTER OF
IN TERP RE TATION : FEDER AL COUR TS AND THE L AW 40 (1997); see also Michel Rosenfeld,
Constitutional Adjudication in the United States and Europe: Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2 INT’ L J.
CONST . L. 633, 655 (2004) (“[T]he countermajoritarian difficulty in the United States stems less
from the judicial vindication of antimajoritarian rights than from the danger that judges, nurtured
on the broad and open-ended common-law approach, will trample on majoritarian laws much
more than is constitutionally necessary.”).
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however, Australia’s judges, lawyers, and theorists are less likely than their
American counterparts to marry constitutional historicism to judicial restraint.
Rather, Australian originalism has for many years been aggressively textualist. In
some, perhaps most cases, the end result is attention to the original understanding
of constitutional provisions. But Australian jurists are generally comfortable
incorporating contemporary norms, even those given authoritative voice only in
foreign jurisdictions or international legal instruments, into interpretation of openended textual provisions. Few would doubt, moreover, that the secular trend in
Australian constitutionalism is toward greater attention to constitutional purpose
and away from the public-meaning originalism promoted by Justice Scalia and by
most academic originalists in the United States. In short, although some version of
originalist judicial practice is hardly peculiar to the United States, the historicist
appeals that support American originalism have a potency that few foreign
constitutional courts can match, not the least the two most like our own.
It is not possible, of course, to establish conclusively what produces this
result. An uncountable number of factors determine the sorts of interpretive
moves that prove persuasive and become conventional within a legal culture; one
must admit a certain risk in reaching conclusions based on considered but
ultimately anecdotal observation of political histories. It is equally obvious,
however, that such observation strongly recommends a set of hypotheses that
usefully informs the American debate over originalism.
Part IV considers six such hypotheses. First is the effect that the passage
of time has over our tendencies to lionize historical figures and cohorts. Even if
we cannot expect Madison to understand our world, his imprimatur is worth more
than that of the “rascals” who currently populate our politics. Moreover, the fact
that in principle we have yet to scrap our Constitution inevitably breeds a certain
confidence in the correctness of its original assumptions.
Second, and in aid of the first, our Constitution is perceived as
revolutionary rather than evolutionary. The United States announced its
sovereignty quickly, painfully, and without sympathy to its former colonizers. A
political identity so formed is not easily refashioned in light of evolving
contemporary circumstances, at least not overtly. The sovereign “moments” of
Canada and Australia were glacial by comparison; although both countries had
functional constitutions by the start of the twentieth century, Canada’s could not
be amended domestically until 1982 and both countries were to varying degrees
formally bound by British Crown well into the 1980s.
Third, American originalism is an instrument through which a domestic
sociopolitical movement seeks to influence our courts. If that movement is a
backlash against the rights-affinity of the Warren and Burger Courts,12 there is
12

S ee Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash , 42
HAR V. C.R.-C.L. L. RE V. 373 (2007); Greene, supra note 1, at 674 -82.
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little reason to expect a counterpart to emerge organically from different political
conditions in other countries. Australia’s Constitution lacks a bill of rights,
thereby tempering (though not eliminating) the High Court’s ability to frustrate
legislative majorities to protect individual rights. Canada does of course have the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and its Supreme Court aggressively polices it,
but the Court might have done so too recently to generate an effectively mobilized
backlash.
Fourth, and in aid of the third, the American public participates in the
selection of Supreme Court Justices to a degree unheard of in most of the world.
Confirmation hearings are the principal site at which the sociopolitical movement
behind originalism invites the public into a conversation about constitutional
methodology. No remotely comparable mechanism exists in Canada or in
Australia, wherein the reigning government selects high court judges and wherein
convention dictates that the selection be informed by some combination of
expertise and ordinary political patronage rather than by ideological
considerations.
Fifth, the American ethos of cultural and political assimilation inflates a
narrative of fidelity to a unitary interpretation of the Constitution and deflates
narratives of interpretive contest. The notion that interpretation should be openended, not because the Constitution is vague but because the Constitution is
indeterminate, gains far more traction in Canadian legal discourse than in that of
Australia or the United States. I suggest that this results in part from Canada’s
existential commitment to multiculturalism.
Finally, something must be said of religion. Constitutionalism is often
called our civil religion, and the originalism movement that so glorifies the
Constitution’s original understanding is conspicuously commingled with an
evangelical movement that tends to disfavor departures from the original meaning
of God’s word. The United States in 2009 is the world’s most religious Western
democracy, and a substantial number of Americans are at best ambivalent toward
the use of reason and creativity in exegesis of sacred texts; yet that is precisely the
toolkit of the judge tasked with applying constitutional principles dynamically
rather than ministerially.
These six proposed hypotheses vary in strength and persuasiveness.
Readers will have their favorites as I have mine. The list is not, moreover, meant
to be exhaustive. (In fine non -originalist fashion, it answers not to the canon of
exclusio unius est exclusio alterius.) It is sufficiently exemplary, however, to
demonstrate that originalism is not culturally indifferent. The appeal of
originalism domestically lies neither in its integrity as a theory of interpretation13
nor, wholly, in its success as a political practice. 14 Rather, originalism is a product
13
14

A theme I develop in other work, see Greene, supra note 1.
See id .
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of time, of place, and of ethos. Part V offers, then, that in the language of Philip
Bobbitt’s well-known typology,15 historical argument is itself a form of ethical
argument. Taken seriously, that realization is potentially self -defeating for
originalists; and for non -originalists, it recommends foregoing the debater’s points
so common in legal academic literature in favor of an aggressive emphasis on a
contrary, more sympathetic ethos.

II. Our Originalism
It is frequently said that all constitutional interpretation is originalist.16
That is not so much a statement about constitutional theory as about constitutional
fidelity. Interpretation of a text entails deciphering one of two meanings: that
intended by the text’s author or that understood by the text’s original audience.17
To assign some other meaning to a text—its contemporary meaning, for
example—is to disclaim fidelity to it. If, by fortuity, the word “Senator” comes in
a later age to mean “sandwich,” each state is not thereby entitled to two free
lunches. Unless, that is, we are not interested in constitutional fidelity. 18
When it comes to the customary nomenclature of American constitutional
theory, we are not all originalists. To call oneself an originalist is not simply to
proclaim fidelity to the Constitution but to privilege the original understanding of
the document as against alterations to that understanding brought about through
social change and judicial innovation. It is, moreover, to consider the original
understanding dispositive or at least presumptively correct in matters of first
impression. Most constitutional lawyers consider original understanding relevant
but not dispositive: Precedent, unwritten implications from constitutional
structure, contemporary public understanding, and political consequences are also
relevant. Originalists generally are either, by degrees, less sanguine about these
alternative sources of constitutional meaning, or believe them irrelevant to

15

See PHILIP BOBBITT , CONS TITU TION AL FATE (1982).
See MICH AEL J. PERR Y, MOR AL ITY POLITICS , AND L AW 280 (1988); Paul Horwitz, The Past,
Tense: The History of Crisis—and the Crisis of History—in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB . L.
REV. 459, 472 (1997) (reviewing L AUR A K ALM AN , TH E S TR ANGE C ARE ER OF LEG AL L IBER ALISM
(1996)); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL . L. RE V. 1599, 1603
(1989).
17
See PERRY , supra note 16 ; AN TONIN SC AL IA, Response, in A M ATTER OF IN TE RP RETATION :
FEDERAL COUR TS AND THE L AW 129, 144 (1997).
18
That is not to say that fidelity requires that a principle embodied within a text be applied
consistently across generations. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A M ATTER OF
IN TERP RE TATION : FEDER AL COUR TS AND THE L AW 115, 119-20 (1997); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion
and Original Meaning , 24 CONST. COM M . 291 (2007); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism
(Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 07 -24, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244).
16
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constitutional meaning but, for prudential reasons, appropriate in limited ways to
the crafting of judicial decision rules. 1 9
My use of the term “original understanding” is deliberate. As I use it, it
can refer either to the original subjective intent of the framers or ratifiers as to the
meaning and scope of a constitutional provision or to the original semantic
meaning of the text of the provision. There has been a gradual but dramatic shift
in preference among academic originalists in favor of original meaning rather
than original intent. 20 Here is not the place to examine the interesting arguments
in favor of one or the other, except to note that one’s intent as to the scope of a
provision and one’s reasonable expectation as to its application are both
theoretically distinct from the original meaning of the provision’s text but in
practice may be difficult to disentangle. Justice Scalia, for example, is notionally
committed to the authority of original meaning b ut nonetheless cannot accept that
the original meaning of “cruel and unusual” may in later years come to apply to
capital punishment. Persuasive evidence as to original expected application, such
as the references to capital punishment in the Fifth Amendment, seems in practice
to drive Scalia’s assessment of original meaning. 21 It is indeed difficult to recall a
case in which any self-proclaimed originalist judge has perceived daylight
between original meaning, original expected application, and original intent,
notwithstanding the fierce academic debate over these distinctions.
The academic discourse around originalism also increasingly distinguishes
between constitutional interpretation, which is a hermeneutic exercise common to
literature and law alike, and constitutional construction, which is a political and
adjudicative exercise designed to fill the interstices of constitutional text.22
Interpretive originalists and constructive originalists are conceptually separate
populations, but this, again, is a distinction fastidiously maintained in academic
literature but generally unexpressed in judicial opinions or public discourse.
It is perhaps obvious but is too little recognized that discussion of
originalism is not confined to the academy.23 Originalism is a term that, today
anyway, has content within a public discourse that extends well beyond the law
reviews. Rush Limbaugh puts the matter succinctly:

19

S ee ROBER T H. BO RK , THE TEM P TING OF AM ERIC A: THE POLITIC AL SEDUC TION OF THE L AW 158
(1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. RE V. 849, 861 (1989);
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk , 84 N.Y.U. L. RE V.1, 35 (2009).
20
See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. RE V . 611 (1999); Keith
E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO . J.L. & PUB . POL ’ Y 599, 608 (2004).
21
See SC AL IA, supra note 11, at 46; Balkin, supra note 8, at 443 -49.
22
See KEITH E. WH ITTING TON , CONS TITU TION AL IN TERP RE TATION : TEX TU AL ME AN ING ,
ORIGIN AL IN TEN T , & JUD ICIAL RE VIEW 7-11 (1999).
23
See Greene, supra note 1; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The
Right’s Living Constitution , 75 FORDHAM L. RE V . 545 (2006).
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The only antidote to . . . judicial activism is the conservative
judicial philosophy known as Originalism. As Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas explained in a February 2001 speech . . .: “The
Constitution means what the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention and
the state ratifying conventions understood it to mean; not what we judges
think it should mean.” Hallelujah.
Originalism means not molding the Constitution to fit your
political and social beliefs. It means not citing foreign law to support your
preferences. It means not imposing your personal policy whims on society
via judicial fiat. And where the Constitution is silent, it means not
inventing a penumbra to support your own opinion.24
A significant segment of the population associates originalism with the values
Limbaugh specifies. 25 It is simple, it is suspicious of grants of discretion to legal
elites, it is hostile to transnational sources of law, and, significantly, it is the “only
antidote” to judicial activism.
Polling data suggests that a substantial number of Americans find
originalism at least superficially compelling. A series of polls conducted annually
by Quinnipiac University from 2003 to 2008 consistently found that four in ten
Americans or more said that “[i]n making decisions, the Supreme Court should
only consider the original intentions of the authors of the Constitution” as
opposed to “consider[ing] changing times and current realities in applying the
principles of the Constitution.”26 These polls perhaps suggest that much of the
American public finds the distinction between original intent and original
meaning far less interesting than do legal academics. Indeed, even though the
debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens in Heller is best construed as a
contest between the legal authority of constitutional meaning versus constitutional
purpose,27 much of the public response to the decision assimilated both opinions
to a single interpretive modality: original intent. 28 In the great debates of
24

Rush Limbaugh, Limbaugh Fundamentals: What is Originalism? , in THE LIM B AUGH LE TTER
(2005), available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/menu/limfunoriginalism.guest.html.
25
In 2005 Reagan Justice Department alum and radio talk-show host Mark Levin published a
book called Men in Black: How the Supreme Court is Destroying America , in which originalism
featured prominently. The book spent nine weeks on the New York Times best seller list. See Best
Sellers: April 24, 2005 , N.Y. TIM E S , Apr. 24, 2005, at 26.
26
Press Release, Quinnipiac Polling Institute, American Voters Oppose Same-Sex Marriage
Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, but They Don’t Want Government To Ban It (July 17,
2008), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/poling/us07172008.doc.
27
See Greene, supra note 1, at 163.
28
Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer’s response was typical of many:
I think what is really interesting is that the dissent by John Paul Stevens, the
most distinguished of the liberals on the other side, . . . was almost entirely based on
originalism, i.e. it was about what was intended by the founders at the time of the writing
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American constitutional theory, this error is a technical one only. As Scalia has
written, “The Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not
between Framers’ intent and objective meaning, but rather that between original
meaning (whether derived from Framers’ intent or not) and current meaning.”29
Heller demonstrates the elevated space originalism occupies within
American legal and political culture. The opinion overruled the opinions of
dozens if not hundreds of federal court judges, read a 69 -year-old Supreme Court
precedent into oblivion, and called into serious question the gun control
regulations of several of the nation’s largest and most crime-ridden metropolitan
areas, including of course the one in which the Court itself sits. The Court did so
over the stated objections of four Justices, five states, and the cities of Baltimore,
Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia,
Sacramento, San Francisco, Seattle, and Trenton.3 0 Against that opposition the
Court relied almost entirely on a single proposition: that the original meaning of
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed” is not
limited to the militia -related purpose that concededly animated the right’s
codification. 31
Virtually every constitutional court engages in pluralistic interpretation,32
but in very few would an opinion like Heller be possible. First, it is not every
court that feels sufficiently legitimated to order local governments to refrain from
disarming their citizens. Second, those courts that do enjoy that level of
legitimacy are infrequently originalist. Third, whether generally originalist or not,
in no other country I am aware of is it conceivable that the court would mount
such a direct political challenge solely on the basis of historical arguments that
conflict with longstanding precedents and political practice. It was fewer than two
decades ago, after all, that former Chief Justice Warren Burger (no pinko, he)
of this amendment. . . . So I thought it was interesting agreement on that, on the
philosophical premise.

See Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox television broadcast Jun. 26, 2008). For additional
examples in this vein, see Greene, supra note 1, at 687 and nn.181-82.
29
SC AL IA, supra note 11, at 38.
30
See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id . at
2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief for New York, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07 -290); Brief of Major American Cities,
et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783
(2008) (No. 07 -290); Brief of the City of Chicago and the Board of Education of the City of
Chicago as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783
(2008) (No. 07 -290).
31
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
32
See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Conclusions, in IN TERP RE TING CONS TITU TIONS : A COM P AR ATIVE
S TUD Y 321, 325 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006); cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions as “Living
Trees”? Comparative Constitutional Law and Interpretive Metaphors, 75 FORDHAM L. RE V . 921,
926 (2006).
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called the very argument used successfully in Heller “one of the greatest pieces of
fraud, I repeat the word ‘fraud,’ on the American public by special interest groups
that I have ever seen in my lifetime.” 33 Two years earlier Robert Bork—Robert
Bork!—had said that the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the right of states to
form militia, not for individuals to bear arms,” and that all state gun -control laws
were “probably constitutional.” 34 Yet in the immediate aftermath of Heller both
John McCain, strongly, and Barack Obama, tepidly, endorsed the Court’s
decision. 3 5
Originalism is the instrument and the beneficiary of a deliberate decision
by former Attorney General Edwin Meese and others to structure the Reagan
Justice Department’s critique of the Warren and Burger Courts in jurisprudential
terms. Abetted by organizations like the Federalist Society and think tanks like
the Center for Judicial Studies, Meese began a campaign during Reagan’s second
term to promote publicly the view that originalism is the only way to control
activist judges.36 The rhetorical core of the campaign was a well-publicized series
of speeches by Meese in 1985 and 1986. In a July 1985 speech to the American
Bar Association, for example, Meese stated, “It has been and will continue to be
the policy of this administration to press for a jurisprudence of original
intention .”37 The Administration, he said, would “resurrect the original meaning”
of constitutional provisions as “the only reliable guide for judgment.”38 When
Bork was nominated to the Court in the summer of 1987, the American people
had already been primed to debate the interpretive methodology Bork notoriously
promoted.
Some form of originalism is not new to American judicial culture. It is not
unusual to find strong statements of the need to give constitutional text the
meaning intended by its framers in nineteenth -century Supreme Court opinions,
ranging from Chief Justice Marshall’s dissent in Ogden v. Saunders,3 9 to Chief
33

MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour: First Freedoms (PBS television broadcast Dec. 16, 1991).
See Claudia Luther, Bork Says State Gun Laws Constitutional, L.A. TIM ES , Mar. 15, 1989, at
B5, quoted in Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HAR V. L. RE V . 191, 224 (2008).
35
See Mike Dorning, Obama Hedges on Gun Ruling; Republicans Accuse Candidate of “FlipFlop” , CHI. TR IB ., Jun. 27, 2008, at 20.
36
See Greene, supra note 1, at 680-81; Siegel, supra note 34, at 220-22.
37
Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution ,
27 S. TEX . L. R E V. 455, 465 (1986) (emphasis in original).
38
Id . at 465 -66.
39
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“To say that the intention of the
[Constitution] must prevail; that this intention must be collected from its words; that its words are
to be understood in that sense in which they are generally used by those for whom the instrument
was intended; that its provisions are neither to be restricted into insignificance, nor extended to
objects not contemplated in them, nor contemplated by its framers; —is to repeat what has been
already said more at large, and is all that can be necessary.”).
34
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Justice Taney’s majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford ,40 to Chief Justice
Fuller’s opinion in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust .41 Ex parte Bain , a habeas
case concerning the ability of a federal prosecutor to amend an indictment, is
typical of nineteenth -century rhetoric. Justice Miller wrote: “It is never to be
forgotten that, in the construction of the language of the Constitution here relied
on, as indeed in all other instances where construction becomes necessary, we are
to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed
that instrument.”4 2
The Progressive era saw the first serious scholarly and judicial challenges
to the assumption that constitutional interpretation should be tied to original
understanding. Justice Holmes’s pragmatism and Justice Brandeis’s prudentialism
led both to be suspicious of doctrinaire interpretive modalities that limited the
Constitution’s capacity to adapt to modern problems. Thus, in Missouri v.
Holland , Justice Holmes urged that the Constitution must grow along with the
nation it is meant to govern:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for
them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a
century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that
they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of
our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred
years ago.43
Justice Brandeis brandished his nonoriginalist credentials most pointedly in his
dissent in Olmstead v. United States, in which he argued that the Fourth
Amendment applies to the wiretapping of telephone conversations. He wrote,
“[G]eneral limitations on the powers of Government . . . do not forbid the United
States or the States from meeting modern conditions by regulations which a
40

60 U.S. 393, 426 (1857) (“If any of [the Constitution’s] provisions are deemed unjust, there is a
mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains
unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only
the same in words, but the same in meaning . . . and intent with which it spoke when it came from
the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States.”).
41
157 U.S. 429, 558 (1895) (framing the Court’s inquiry into the constitutionality of the income
tax as “what, at the time the Constitution was framed and adopted, were recognized as direct
taxes? What did those who framed and adopted it understand the terms to designate and

include?”).
42
121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
43
252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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century ago, or probably even a half a century ago, probably would have been
rejected as arbitrary and oppressive,” and likewise “[c]lauses guaranteeing to the
individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar
capacity of adaptation to a changing world.” 44 The Court’s progressives “won”
with Justice Roberts’s embrace of progressive interpretation over Justice
Sutherland’s originalist dissent in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish , and in the 45 years
between Sutherland’s retirement in 1941 and Justice Scalia’s appointment in
1986, Hugo Black was the Court’s only self-avowed originalist. 4 5
Meese and his allies’ frequent resort to metaphors of restoration —his use
of the word “resurrect” was no accident—was facilitated by the Warren and
Burger Courts’ refusal to ground a series of prominent individual rights decisions
in originalist terms. Griswold v. Connecticut ,46 Mapp v. Ohio ,47 Miranda v.
Arizona ,48 Reynolds v. Sims,4 9 and Roe v. Wade50 are among the usual suspects,
and we could add Brown v. Board of Education5 1 to the list were that case not
preternaturally immune from judicial critique. Bork and Scalia alike have
suggested that the Warren Court’s abandonment of originalism is an historical
anomaly, and that it is the duty of the Court’s conservatives to right the ship.52
But in important ways, Our Originalism —the methodological child of the Meese
movement—is not our fathers’. As Meese, Limbaugh, and Scalia frequently
explain, they understand originalism to be a tool of judicial restraint; its
alternative is an unattractive world in which “nine lawyers presume to be the
authoritative conscience of the nation.”53 Justice Sutherland’s originalism
emphatically did not emphasize judicial restraint, which Sutherland said “belongs
in the domain of will and not of judgment.”54
It is ironic, then, that another distinguishing characteristic of the latest
originalism movement is its hostility to precedent. Justice Thomas has suggested a
willingness to overrule constitutional precedents that are contrary to the original
understanding,5 5 and Justice Scalia, who has called himself a “faint-hearted
originalist,” 56 has indicated that his occasional deference to longstanding
44

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See HUGO L AF AYE TTE BL ACK , A CONS TITU TION AL F AITH (1968).
46
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
48
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
50
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52
See BORK , supra note 19 , at 143; Scalia, supra note 19 , at 852 -54.
53
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54
West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 403 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
55
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
56
Scalia, supra note 19, at 864.
45
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precedent that he disagrees with is “not part of [his] originalist philosophy, [but] a
pragmatic exception to it.” 5 7 Heller was blithely dismissive of the Court’s Second
Amendment decision in United States v. Miller, 58 and Justice Scalia has
advocated abandoning prior precedent in favor of original understanding in Eighth
Amendment, campaign finance, and abortion cases among others.5 9 By contrast,
there was no significant tension articulated between originalism and stare decisis
before Justice Black’s tenure on the Court.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the originalism of today is the
product of a political mobilization. It is not merely the idiosyncratic preference of
a single Justice, as in the case of Black; it is a movement that preceded the
nominations of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas and was deliberately designed
to produce their jurisprudential approaches. It is discussed on talk radio and in
bestselling books; in blogs and in newspaper columns; in presidential campaigns
and at water coolers. Originalism has not “triumphed,” as some suggested in the
wake of Heller. 60 But it has proven persuasive in a non -trivial number of cases,61
it lies squarely at the center of academic conversation in constitutional theory, and
it is an important part of the national dialogue, such as there is one, about the
proper role of the judiciary within a democracy. Or our democracy, at least.

III. The Lives of Others : The Cases of Canada and Australia

57

SC AL IA, supra note 17, at 140; see Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical
Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia , 74 B.U. L. RE V . 25, 32 (1994).
58
307 U.S. 174 (1939 ); see Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2814-15.
59
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (rejecting the holding of
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality
guarantee); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 247 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing, pace Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), that limitations
on corporate campaign expenditures violate the First Amendment and noting his view that, pace
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), campaign contribution limits also violate the First
Amendment); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Roe v. Wade, (1973),
should be overruled); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (overruling Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), to hold that the admission of testimonial hearsay without an
opportunity for cross-examination by the defendant violates the Sixth Amendment).
60
See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortion, and the Unraveling of the Rule of Law , 95
VA. L. RE V. 253, 254 (2009); Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It
Says, WALL S T . J., June 27, 2008, at A13; Heller on a First Read, Posting of Dale Carpenter to the
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1214514180.shtml (June 26, 2008 5:03 p.m. EST);
cf. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. RE V . 611, 613 (1999)
(declaring originalism’s ascendancy by the end of the 1990s).
61
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783; Crawford, 541 U.S. 236; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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Outside the United States, American originalism is as well-known as it is
marginalized. The reasons for the latter, which I take up in Part IV, are
complicated. The former is more easily explained in light of the crosspollinization of constitutional theory through scholarly exchange, transnational
judicial conferences, and cross-reference in judicial practice—what Sujit
Choudhury has called the “migration” of constitutional ideas.6 2 Since the start of
2007 more than 100 academic articles with originalism in the title have been
published in legal periodicals, and a vast array of resources greet the foreign judge
or constitutional theorist interested in comparative study. The law journal
database maintained by Washington & Lee School of Law includes more than 200
international and comparative law journals, more than 100 of which are located
outside the United States,63 and Lexis-Nexis serves customers in more than 100
countries.6 4 Judges around the world also of course interact in person in a wide
range of settings, 6 5 and Justice Scalia is no exception. Justice Scalia took at least
25 trips to foreign locations for speeches, teaching, and conferences from 2003 to
2007. 66 Originalism is a frequent topic of conversation at those appearances.67
The trouble is, hardly anyone is biting. If we take originalism to require
that the original understanding of a constitutional text is dispositive when known,
it is an exceedingly unpopular view around the world. Michel Rosenfeld calls
originalism “virtually nonexistent” in all of Europe.68 The highly influential
German Constitutional Court has favored a purposive approach to interpretation
that generally privileges telos over original intentions.69 The high courts of India,
62

SUJIT CHOUDHUR Y , Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law , in THE
MIGR ATION O F CONS TITU TION AL IDE AS 1, 1 (Sujit Choudhury ed., 2006); see Claire L’HeureuxDube, Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULS A L.J. 15, 17
(1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. IN T ’L L.J. 191, 195
(2003).
63
See Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking,
http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx.
64
See LexisNexis Fast Facts, http://www.lexisnexis.com/media/fast-facts.aspx.
65
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization , 40 VA. J. IN T’L L. 1103 (2000).
66
Locations include Switzerland, Israel, Italy, Ireland, Australia, Turkey, Canada, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Greece, and France.
67
See, e.g., Kirby, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor
Worship? , 24 MELB . U. L. R E V. 1, 1-2 (2000) (discussing Justice Scalia’s appearance at a 1999
conference on constitutionalism held in Auckland, New Zealand); Kirk Makin, Senior U.S.,
Canadian Judges Spar over Judicial Activism, GLOBE & M AIL , Feb. 17, 2007 (describing a
spirited debate over originalism between Justice Scalia and Canadian Justice Ian Binnie at McGill
University); John O’Sullivan, High Court Opposites Dazzling Off the Bench , CHICAGO S UN TIM E S , Oct. 25, 2005, at 43 (discussing a debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer held in
Melbourne, Australia).
68
Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 656.
69
See Donald P. Kommers, Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties, in INTERP RE TING
CONSTITU TIONS : A COM P AR ATIVE S TUD Y, supra note 32, at 161, 197 -200.
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South Africa, and Israel display something approaching open hostility to narrow
textualism or static historicism.70 In Canada, as we shall see, even the most vocal
opponents of the Supreme Court’s putatively activist decisions infrequently resort
to originalist arguments. Australia’s appears to be among the world’s very few
established constitutional courts in which arguments from the original
understandings of the ratifying generation are taken seriously in the face of
contrary teleological arguments grounded in contemporary understandings.
These last two examples are the subject of this Part. In examining in some
detail the approaches the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of
Australia take to interpretation of their national constitutions, I hope to generate
hypotheses as to the causes of originalism’s particular uses and relative popularity
in the United States. Part III.A discusses Canada, in which the “living tree”
analogy continues to exert a powerful influence on constitutional discourse in
rights and powers cases alike. Part III.B addresses the more complicated case of
Australia, whose High Court has traditionally espoused a textual literalism that is
relatively strict and historically informed but has recently been receptive to
purposivism and to the dynamic influence of contemporary values.
A. Canada’s Charter Evolution
Modern Canadian constitutionalism began, with modern Canada, in 1982.
Although Canada became a distinct and de facto self-governing legal entity with
the enactment of the British North America Act, 1867 (BNA Act), it did not
become formally sovereign until the Canada Act, 1982. The Canada Act declared
more than 30 documents to constitute Canadian Supreme Law, the most
significant of which were the BNA Act (renamed the Constitution Act, 1867), the
Constitution Act, 1982 (Schedule B of the Canada Act), and the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (the first 35 sections of the Constitution Act, 1982). This Section
broadly discusses judicial review by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
and the Supreme Court of Canada, first under the BNA Act—which principally
involved federalism disputes—and more recently under the Constitution Act,
1982, where Charter litigation predominates.
1. Judicial Review Under the BNA Act

70

See Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India , 1 INT’L J. CONS. L. 476, 480 (2003); Heinz
Klug, South Africa: From Constitutional Promise to Social Transformation , in INTE RP RETING
CONSTITU TIONS : A COM P AR ATIVE S TUD Y, supra note 32, at 266, 288 -89; Yoav Dotan, Judicial
Accountability in Israel: The High Court of Justice and the Phenomena of Judicial Hyperactivism,
8 ISR AEL I AF F AIR S 87 (2002).
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The BNA Act merged the three British colonies of Canada, New
Brunswick, and Nova Scotia into the nation of Canada. The former colony of
Canada, previously subdivided into East and West, was separated into the
provinces of Québec and Ontario, giving the original nation of Canada a total of
four provincial governments. Canada was given a federal structure with a
bicameral parliament and a vertical separation of powers between the national and
the provincial governments. Since the BNA Act did not include a Bill of Rights,
the Canadian parliament was, like the British parliament, supreme within its
legitimate sphere of action.71 The content of that sphere was contested from the
start, however, as the boundaries between national and provincial power were
blurred in the BNA Act. 72 Specifically, section 91 of the Act gives the federal
government exclusive jurisdiction over several broad areas thought to be of
national interest, including “trade and commerce,” and section 92 gives exclusive
jurisdiction to provincial governments over other broad areas thought to be locally
focused, such as “property and civil rights.”73 It is easy to imagine examples in
which these grants of authority cannot be mutually exclusive. 74
The power of the Canadian national government was initially bounded,
moreover, by the superior authority of the Crown. British statutes applied in full
force in Canada until the Statute of Westminster, 1931 provided that Canada’s
legislature could opt in or out.75 Canada did not formally acquire the power to
amend its own Supreme Law until 1982. The British place atop Canada’s legal
hierarchy was particularly relevant to the practice of judicial review during
Canada’s early history. The Supreme Court of Canada is a statutory animal,
created by an act of the Canadian parliament in 1875 and currently authorized not
by the Constitution but by the Supreme Court Act.7 6 Until 1949 the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, sitting on Downing Street, was Canada’s
appellate court of last resort, and over a fifty -year period from 1880 to 1930 the
Privy Council took a rather heavy -handed approach to its Canadian constitutional
duties.77
The Privy Council set the interpretive tone early, with Lord Hobhouse
declaring in the 1887 case of Bank of Toronto v. Lambe that the BNA Act should
71

See Hodge v. The Queen, 9 App. Cas. 117, 132 (P.C. 1883) (appeal taken from Ont.).
See Peter W. Hogg, Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court, in IN TERP RE TING
CONSTITU TIONS : A COM P AR ATIVE S TUD Y, supra note 32, at 55, 66 -69.
73
Constitution Act, 1867, §§ 91(2), 92(13).
74
See, e.g., Citizens Ins. Co. of Canada v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C. 1881) (appeal taken from
Can.) (granting provincial power over insurance regulation). The BNA Act formally assigns to the
national government the residual power to legislate “for the Peace, Order, and good Government
of Canada.” Constitution Act, 1867, § 91.
75
Statute of Westminster, 1931 (UK), 22 & 23 Geo. 5.
76
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26 § 3 (1985).
77
See CAN AD IAN CONS TITU TION AL L AW 90 (Bakan et al. eds., 3d ed. 2003).
72
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be treated “by the same methods of construction and exposition that [British
courts] apply to other statutes.”7 8 What that meant in theory was that
constitutional interpretation was to be guided by literal textual exegesis that relied
rigidly on original public meaning coupled with stare decisis and that strictly
ignored extrinsic sources or reference to the intent of the legislature. 79 What it
meant in practice and in effect was a gradual diminution in national power in
relation to provincial governments.8 0 From 1880 to 1896 the Privy Council
decided twenty issues concerning the separation of powers between the federal
and provincial governments, and it ruled in favor of the provinces in fifteen of
them.81 The strict federalism the Law Lords enforced was arguably consistent
with the text of the BNA Act but was very much at odds with the constitutional
vision of many of the Act’s drafters.82
The Privy Council dramatically and self -consciously departed from static
text-bound interpretation in the 1930 case of Edwards v. Attorney General,
popularly known as the “Persons Case.”83 The BNA Act provides that the
Canadian Senate is to comprise “qualified persons,” a term whose original
meaning, in the unanimous view of the Supreme Court of Canada, did not include
women.84 The case might easily have stood as Canada’s Dred Scott v. Sandford,85
but Lord Sankey turned it into Canada’s Brown v. Board of Education : “the

78

Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, 12 App. Cas. 575, 579 (P.C. 1887) (appeal taken from Can.).
See Hogg, supra note 72, at 79; Vincent C. MacDonald, Judicial Interpretation of the Canadian
Constitution , 1 U. TORON TO L.J. 260, 268 (1936).
80
See MacDonald, supra note 79, at 277-78; see also Ian Binnie, Constitutional Interpretation and
Original Intent, 23 SUP . CT. L. RE V. (2d) 345, 357 (2004) (describing the federalist jurisprudence
of Lord Watson and Lord Haldane).
81
PETER H. RUS SELL , CON S TITU TIO N AL OD YS SE Y: C AN C AN AD IANS BECOM E A SO VEREIGN
PEOP LE ? 42 (2004). By contrast, during the four-year period during which it was Canada’s court
of last resort, the Supreme Court of Canada decided five of its six federalism cases in the national
government’s favor. See JO HN T. S AYW E LL , THE L AW M AKERS : JUD IC IAL POW ER AND TH E
SH AP ING OF C AN AD IAN FEDER ATION 34 (2002).
82
See RUSSELL , supra note 81, at 43; H.E. Smith, The Residue of Power in Canada , 4 CAN. BAR
REV. 432, 433 (1926) (“By excluding . . . historical evidence and considering the British North
America Act without any regard to its historical setting the courts have recently imposed upon us a
constitution which is different, not only in detail but in principle, from that designed at
Charlottetown and Québec.”). There is no consensus among Canadian legal academics as to the
intentions of the “framers” of the BNA Act, in part because there is no consensus over who counts
as a framer. See Binnie, supra note 80, at 275; Peter W. Hogg & Wade K. Wright, Canadian
Federalism, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Debate About Canadian
Federalism, 38 U.B.C. L. RE V . 329, 331 (2005).
83
[1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.).
84
[1928] S.C.R. 276.
85
60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that Dred Scott could not be a citizen of the United States because
the word “citizen” was not originally understood to include blacks).
79
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appeal to history,” he wrote, “is not conclusive.” 86 Rather, Lord Sankey said that
constitutional interpretation requires attention to the “continuous process of
evolution” within Canadian society.87 In what has become the most famous
passage in Canadian constitutional law, he wrote further:
The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree
capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits. The object of
the Act was to grant a Constitution to Canada. Like all written
constitutions it has been subjected to development through usage and
convention. Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this
Board—it is certainly not their desire—to cut down the provisions of the
Act by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a large
and liberal interpretation so that the Dominion to a great extent, but within
certain fixed limits, may be a mistress in her own house, as the provinces
to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, are mistresses in theirs. 88
In one stroke Lord Sankey’s opinion in Edwards effected four reversals, each
momentous standing alone. 8 9 First, and most immediately, it overturned the
Supreme Court and granted women the right to serve in the Senate. Second, in
drawing a parallel between the sovereignty retained within the provinces and that
retained within the national legislature, the Committee seemed to signal an end to
its prior bias in favor of provincial authority. Third, the Privy Council recognized
Canada’s autonomy to govern her own internal affairs, a nod to the Statute of
Westminster that was already en route to passage and a presage to the formal end
to Privy Council jurisdiction over Canadian cases, which would come nineteen
years later. 90 Finally, and most significantly for our purposes, the BNA Act would
henceforward no longer be interpreted as an ordinary statute whose meaning is
inalterably fixed by the original meaning of its text and judicial interpretation

86

Edwards, [1930] A.C. at 134; cf. Brown , 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (finding evidence of the
intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment as to segregated schools “at best . . .
inconclusive”).
87
Edwards, [1930] A.C. at 134.
88
Id . at 136.
89
See S AYW ELL , supra note 81, at 192 (“In its explicit reasoning and result, Edwards was a sharp
break with previous Judicial Committee jurisprudence.”).
90
See, e.g., Reference re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada, [1932] A.C.
304, 312 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.) (upholding the national government’s power to pass
implementing legislation for an international agreement on radio under the general power to make
laws for “peace order and good government” even though “[t]his idea of Canada as a Dominion
being bound by a convention equivalent to a treaty with foreign powers was quite unthought of in
1867”).
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thereof.91 Instead, interpretation would be “large and liberal,” with an eye trained
not on narrow constructions of statutory text but on constitutional purposes and
national growth.
The idea of a constitution as a living entity was not, of course, invented by
Lord Sankey. Abbott Lawrence Lowell described a political system as “not a
mere machine [but] an organism” as early as 1889, and the notion of fundamental
law as essentially organic influenced the likes of Woodrow Wilson and Oliver
Wendell Holmes. 92 But the metaphor of constitutional evolution ripened earlier in
Canada than in the United States. Although Edwards was in effect a rights case,
the Judicial Committee quickly extended the living tree principle to structural
cases. Thus, in Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. AG Canada , the
Committee affirmed the authority of the national government to enact a statute
criminalizing certain anti-competitive behavior even though the offenses were not
criminal at the time of Confederation.9 3 And in British Coal Corporation v. The
King, the Committee upheld a federal statute removing the Privy Council’s
criminal appellate jurisdiction and reiterated that “in interpreting a constituent or
organic statute such as the [BNA] Act, that construction most beneficial to the
widest possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted.”94 As in the United
States during the same period, a rejection of originalism was usually in the service
of judicial restraint; the idea was that the Constitution should not be construed so
literally as to hamstring a government in responding to the vital issues of the
day.9 5
And as in the United States, judicial conservatives went down fighting. In
1935 Lord Sankey, author of Edwards and British Coal, was replaced as Lord
Chancellor, and Lord Atkin became the Judicial Committee’s presiding Law Lord
and intellectual leader. Atkin, a former commercial lawyer, was sympathetic with
the notion of freedom of contract and was known to be a staunch defender of
91

See, e.g., Reference re the Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] A.C. 54, 70
(P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.) (“Useful as decided cases are, it is always advisable to get back to
the words of the Act itself and to remember the object with which it was passed.”)
92
See WOODROW WILSON , CON S TITU TION AL GO VERNM EN T IN THE UN ITED S TATE S 56 (1908)
(“[G]overnment is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe,
but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton.”); Gompers v.
United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.) (“[T]he provisions of the Constitution are
not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions
transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal. It is to be gathered not
simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their
growth.”).
93
[1931] A.C. 310 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.).
94
[1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Que.).
95
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stare decisis.96 The timing of Lord Sankey’s departure could hardly have been
worse, then, for Prime Minister R.B. Bennett’s New Deal package of labor
reforms and social insurance measures. In Attorney General v. Attorney General
Ontario (Labour Conventions), the Committee invalidated Bennett’s wage and
hours measures on the ground that, though the statutes were enacted pursuant to
an international treaty under section 132 of the BNA Act, the measures
improperly infringed on provincial autonomy over property and civil rights
granted by section 92. 97 Lord Atkin’s opinion in the Labour Conventions case
offered a lyrical rejoinder to the notion that the decision would frustrate Canada’s
blossoming into a sovereign member of the international community: “While the
ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains
the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original
structure.”98
Unemployment insurance was next, with Lord Atkin dismissing the
Dominion’s argument that, even if insurance was traditionally within the
provincial bailiwick, the legislation creating an unemployment insurance fund fell
within its residual power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government
of Canada in a time of emergency.99 The Judicial Committee also struck down
Dominion statutes regulating natural products and unfair competition,100 again on
federalism grounds. With the New Deal decisions, “the approach to judicial
review, heralded in Edwards . . . was not only abandoned but explicitly
repudiated.”1 01
Lord Atkin announced all of the New Deal decisions on the same January
day in 1937. It is more than a little bit ironic that the decisions came down as the
U.S. Supreme Court was deep in deliberation over West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.102
For while Justice Roberts was engineering the switch in time that saved nine,
Lord Atkin was unwittingly laying the groundwork for abolition of appeals to the
Privy Council. The local reaction to the Committee’s New Deal decisions was
96
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domain. See Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(2A).
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swift and largely negative, in particular from a group of Progressive scholars led
by University of Toronto Law School Dean William Paul McClure Kennedy and
McGill law professor Francis Reginald Sco tt.1 03 Kennedy had written
optimistically during Lord Sankey’s tenure that “the older constitutional law is
being handed over to the historians.”10 4 Understandably, his optimism did not
survive the New Deal decisions. In a symposium in the Canadian Bar Review
devoted to those decisions, he wrote:
The time has come to abandon tinkering with or twisting the
British North America Act—a curiosity belonging to an older age. At long
last we can criticize it, as the stern demands of economic pressure have
bitten into the bastard loyalty which gave to it the doubtful devotion of
primitive ancestor worship.1 05
Referring to the necessary reliance of Canadian law on English conventions of
statutory interpretation, Kennedy virtually seethed, “We would have faced this
issue long ago had we not too largely believed that constitutional and legal
wisdom never really crossed the Atlantic.” 106 Writing in the same symposium,
Scott sounded a similar note: “No alterations to the British North America Act
will ever achieve what Canadians want them to achieve if their interpretation is
left to a non -Canadian judiciary.”107
Not just the academy bristled. The Senate instructed its counsel, W.F.
O’Connor, to prepare a report on the origins of the BNA Act and its interpretation
by the Privy Council. The O’Connor Report, as it came to be known, argued that
the Privy Council had profoundly misinterpreted the intended division of power
between the national and provincial governments, and that (unlike in the United
States) authority was presumptively to rest with the former. 108 O’Connor’s
conclusions remained orthodoxy for three decades,109 during which time Ottawa
made its move. In 1939 Tory MP Charles Cahan introduced a bill abolishing all
appeals to the Privy Council and Minister of Justice Ernest Lapointe referred the
bill to the Supreme Court for a ruling on its constitutionality. The Court found the
103
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bill constitutional and the Judicial Committee affirmed on the authority of the
Statute of Westminster, 1931. 1 10 Appeals to the Privy Council were officially
abolished with passage of the bill and British approval in 1949.
Once the Supreme Court of Canada officially became Canada’s court of
last resort in 1949, it not only became far more hospitable to claims of federal
authority1 11 but it also accelerated the judiciary’s break from the canons of British
statutory interpretation. Thus, although the Court still adheres to stare decisis in
the ordinary course, it has on occasion refused to follow precedents of the Privy
Council. 112 Likewise, the strict ban on reference to parliamentary debate, not
relaxed in the House of Lords until Pepper v. Hart ,11 3 was lifted in Canadian
constitutional cases in the 1970s, 11 4 and the Supreme Court is not mechanically
opposed to referring to the legislative history of the BNA Act. 1 15 Indeed,
mitigation of the old English exclusionary rule with respect to extrinsic sources
has been justified by way of the living tree metaphor. In the Residential Tenancies
Act reference, the Court permitted admission of various policy reports of the
Ontario Law Reform Commission. Wrote Justice Dickson, “A constitutional
reference is not a barren exercise in statutory interpretation. What is involved is
an attempt to determine and give effect to the broad objectives and purpose of the
Constitution, viewed as a ‘living tree’, in the expressive words of Lord
Sankey.”11 6
The Court has used the metaphor regularly since the late 1970s, coinciding
roughly with the strength of the patriation movement. Thus, the Court held in
1979 that a Québec law declaring that official publication of statutes was to be in
French alone was inconsistent with section 133 of the BNA Act, which requires
that provincial legislative acts be published in both English and French.117 In
addressing whether “regulations” published in French also fell within the purview
of section 133, which refers only to “acts,” the Court cited Edwards and wrote:
“Dealing, as this Court is here, with a constitutional guarantee, it would be overlytechnical to ignore the modern development of non -curial adjudicative agencies
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which play so important a role in our society.”118 The living tree doctrine served
provincial rather than federal ends in another pre-Charter federalism case, AG
British Columbia v. Canada Trust Company (Ellet’s Estate), in which the Court
refused to limit the scope of provincial taxing authority to property even though
“direct taxation within the province,” authorized by section 92 of the BNA Act,
may not have been understood in 1867 to permit in personam taxes.119
The living tree metaphor has had a nebulizing effect in structural cases,
freeing both provincial and federal power to spread into domains not originally
anticipated. As we shall see, however, the metaphor has been most fertile in rights
cases, in which its effect is quite the opposite.120

2. A Tree Grows in Canada: Judicial Review Under the Charter
The advent of the Constitution Act, 1982 meant that for the first time in its
history the Supreme Court of Canada would be constitutionally committed to
holding parliamentary and provincial acts invalid on the ground that they violated
individual rights. 121 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes an extensive list
of enumerated rights, including the “fundamental freedoms” of conscience and
religion; thought, belief, opinion and expression, including press and other media
of communication; peaceful assembly; and association.1 22 The Charter also
guarantees, inter alia, the rights to vote, to receive a host of criminal procedural
protections, and to be free from unreasonable search or seizure, arbitrary
detention, and cruel and unusual punishment.12 3 The Charter studiously avoids the
phrase “due process of law,” on which more later, but it does guarantee equality
“before and under the law”124 and “the right to life, liberty and security of the
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person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.” 125
Although the Constitution Act, 1982 contains a Supremacy Clause,1 26 it
also subjects constitutional guarantees to two express limitations. First, the
enumerated rights and freedoms are pronounced “subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society.”1 2 7 The Charter, then, makes explicit what in the United States has been
left to judicial construction: a decision rule for declaring actionable rights
violations.128 Second, section 33 of the Charter permits either the national or a
provincial legislature to declare that a legislative act remains in force
notwithstanding a judicial determination that it violates certain individual rights
guaranteed under the Charter.12 9 The declaration lasts five years and is subject to
renewal by a second vote of the legislature. Québec, which is bound by but has
not ratified the Constitution Act, 1982, retroactively inserted a notwithstanding
declaration into all of its domestic laws in 1982, and its national assembly
invoked the notwithstanding clause for every piece of legislation passed between
1982 and 1985. 1 30 Outside of Québec, however, use of the notwithstanding
mechanism is rare—it has been invoked remedially only thrice by other provinces
and never by the federal parliament.1 31
The sole remaining official recourse against an unpopular Charter decision
is constitutional amendment, but this avenue is only moderately easier than the
Article V process under the U.S. Constitution.132 Most Charter amendments
require agreement of both the House of Commons and the Senate as well as seven
of the ten provincial assemblies. Moreover, an informal norm has developed in
Canada of submitting amendments to popular referendum. This process has
included some spectacular and politically inopportune defeats, including most
prominently the 1992 Charlottetown Accord, which was designed to secure
Québec’s ratification of the Constitution. Even though the federal government, all
125
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ten provincial assembles, the leaders of the three leading political parties, and the
leaders of four national aboriginal groups supported the accord, it was defeated 54
percent to 46 percent. Says Peter Hogg, “One must conclude that significant
amendments to the Constitution of Canada are, at least for the foreseeable future,
impossible.” 133
All of which is to say that judicial interpretations of the Charter are
immensely consequential political acts. In light of the Court’s history —two
decades earlier Ronald Cheffins had labeled it “the quiet court in an unquiet
country”1 34 —it was not inevitable that it would shed its customary timidity upon
enactment of the Charter, but the Justices took to their new role with
uncharacteristic verve. So much so that by the Charter’s tenth anniversary former
Chief Justice Antonio Lamer was prepared to call the Charter “a revolution [on
the scale of] introducing the metric system . . . . Pasteur’s discoveries [and] the
invention of penicillin [and] the laser.” 1 35 In 22 years of adjudication under the
1960 statutory Bill of Rights, only 5 of 35 plaintiffs won their Supreme Court
cases and the Court invalidated only one federal statute.136 Over the first 24 years
of judicial review under the Charter, the Court invalidated 89 laws, including 53
federal statutes.137
The range of cases to which the Canadian judicial power has extended is
broader than in the United States. Canada has no political question or ripeness
doctrine, and mootness and standing rules are lax by comparison.1 38 Moreover,
the Supreme Court regards its competence as comprising a broad remedial
authority.1 39 Thus, in Vriend v. Alberta , the Court found unconstitutional the
Alberta Individual Rights Protection Act for a sin of omission, that is, for not
including sexual orientation as a protected ground from employment
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discrimination. 140 As a remedy, the Court read sexual orientation into the statute
despite a deliberate legislative decision to exclude it. Wrote Justice Iacobucci in
defense of the aggressive remedy, “by definition, Charter scrutiny will always
involve some interference with the legislative will.” 141
More startling from a U.S. constitutional orientation is the Québec
Secession Reference, in which the Court was asked to decide whether Québec
could unilaterally secede from Canada.142 For a court even to answer such a
question is, in a manner of speaking, foreign to our constitutional sensibilities.143
Québec’s as well, I should add —the province refused to participate in the case on
political question grounds. The Supreme Court of Canada not only answered the
question—in the negative—but it did so without reference to anything so concrete
as text or history, the confluence of which forms the core of Our Originalism.
Rather, the Court derived its decision from what it identified as four
unenumerated but fundamental principles which “breathe life” into the Canadian
Constitution: federalism; democracy; constitutionalism and the rule of law; and
respect for minorities. 1 44 The Court wrote in its per curiam opinion:
“[O]bservance of and respect for these principles is essential to the ongoing
process of constitutional development and evolution of our Constitution as a
‘living tree,’ . . .” 145 The Court ultimately decided that while Québec could not
secede unilaterally, if the people of Québec were clearly to express a desire to
secede, all other parties to Confederation would be obligated to renegotiate the
Constitution to give voice to that expression.146 A judicious decision, to be sure,
but not one many Americans would recognize as properly judicial.
The post-Charter Supreme Court of Canada has, with limited exceptions,
been at least as hospitable to rights claims as the U.S. Supreme Court. It has found
140
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comparable constitutional protections in areas such as criminal procedure,
religious freedom, freedom of association and assembly, and privacy rights.14 7 As
the Vriend case suggests, the Supreme Court of Canada has far outpaced its
American cousin in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 1 48 Canada’s high court is also more receptive to claims that sound in
group rights. The Charter specifically protects both affirmative action policies and
minority language rights, and any constitutional amendment dealing with
language rights requires unanimous support from the provinces.149 Indeed, among
the few individual rights that the Supreme Court of Canada protects less than the
U.S. Supreme Court are those that are competitive with group claims. Thus, the
Court not only has upheld a national hate speech law 15 0 but has permitted the
criminalization of pornography that degrades women, on the theory that it
constitutes a form of hate speech.151
But the substantive differences between Canadian and American rights
jurisprudence are minor by comparison to the methodological and rhetorical gulf
separating the two Supreme Courts. The former gulf is, understandably, narrower
than the latter. As Part II discusses, the U.S. Supreme Court is methodologically
pluralistic, and the bark of the domestic originalism movement has always been
worse than its bite. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has never suggested
that original understanding, even at a relatively low level of abstraction, is wholly
irrelevant. 152 But it does not overstate things to suggest that a decision like Heller
is unimaginable in Canada. Among jurists, legal scholars, and (by all indications)
the Canadian public, the notion that a court’s conclusions as to the expectations of
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the founding generation should be sufficient to dispose of a present individual
rights case is nearly risible.
A couple of examples should set the mood. Consider first the British
Columbia Motor Vehicle Act Reference.153 At issue was the constitutionality of a
British Columbia law that made driving with a suspended license a strict liability
criminal offense with a mandatory jail term. The Supreme Court held,
unanimously, that criminal liability and imprisonment without a mens rea element
violated the Charter-enshrined right not to be deprived of liberty “except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 1 54 That language, found in
section 7 of the Charter, is deliberately tortured. Prior to adoption of the Charter,
the legislative committee tasked with reviewing the draft heard testimony from
numerous Department of Justice officials who explained that in composing the
text they specifically avoided using the term “due process” so as to avoid the
paradoxically substantive connotations of that phrase in United States
jurisprudence.1 55
That bit of history did not impress the Court. Writing for all of his eight
colleagues, Justice Lamer wrote that such testimony was entitled to “minimal
weight.”156 It was impossible, on his view, to locate a general legislative intent,
and it would be inappropriate to make dispositive in Charter interpretation “the
comments of a few federal civil servants.”15 7 Moreover, placing any significant
weight on the committee proceedings would mean that:
[T]he rights, freedoms and values embodied in the Charter in effect
become frozen in time to the moment of adoption with little or no
possibility of growth, development and adjustment to changing societal
needs. . . . If the newly planted ‘living tree’ which is the Charter is to have
the possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to
ensure that historical materials . . . do not stunt its growth.158
Instead, the Court said unequivocally that interpretation under the Charter was to
be “purposive;” that is, with reference to the interests a given provision is meant
to protect. Quoting Chief Justice Dickson’s earlier statement in R. v. Big M Drug
Mart , Justice Lamer wrote that any interpretation of Charter rights should be “a
generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the
153
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guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter’s
protection.”159
This approach marks a significant departure from U.S. jurisprudence along
several dimensions. First, the Court’s dismissive attitude toward drafting records
is not just anti-originalist but is more broadly anti-historicist. The intentions of the
framers of the U.S. Constitution, specific and otherwise, remain a vital source of
American constitutional wisdom.1 60 Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Heller
sought to rein in Justice Scalia not through an appeal to the living Constitution but
through relentless emphasis on the intent of the drafters of the Second
Amendment.161 If the Great Divide in the United States is, as Justice Scalia says,
between original meaning and current meaning, the Supreme Court of Canada has
pledged its allegiance to the latter in the clearest of terms.16 2
Second, even granting a stateside trend away from original- intent
originalism,1 63 the approach reflected in Justice Lamer’s opinion is starkly
different from U.S. orthodoxy. Public-meaning originalism does not depend on
drafting history to determine constitutional meaning, but as Justice Scalia has
acknowledged, such history can provide clues as to the original understanding of
the ratifying public. 1 64 The Supreme Court of Canada could have profitably
adopted this approach in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act Reference: Barry Strayer,
one of the Charter’s principal drafters, testified that he understood “fundamental
justice” to be interchangeable with “natural justice,” 165 and indeed the Supreme
Court itself had given the terms equivalence in Duke v. The Queen , which
construed “fundamental justice” under the Canadian Bill of Rights. 1 66 Natural
justice is a familiar common law and administrative law concept in Canada that
generally refers to procedural, not substantive, fairness. 167 Justice Lamer’s refusal
159
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to accord decent respect to the opinions of the Charter’s drafters even to clarify
the original understanding reflects a singular discomfort with turns to history as
an interpretive aide. 168
Finally , and perhaps most unusually from a U.S. perspective, the British
Columbia Motor Vehicle Act Reference committed the Court to a specific and
aggressive method of constitutional interpretation. Self -proclaimed and
unanimous confidence in the high court’s preferred interpretive methodology is
unknown this side of the St. Lawrence. Not only is it rare for the U.S. Supreme
Court to coalesce around a specific interpretive approach, but it is relatively
uncommon for Court opinions to contain extended discussions of constitutional
theory.1 69
Not so the Supreme Court of Canada, which with little controversy has
invoked the living tree metaphor—an explicit excursion into constitutional
theory—in no fewer than nineteen lead opinions since the Charter was enacted.170
Indeed, the Court used the metaphor in its very first case under the Charter, Law
Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, in which it held that an Ontario law
limiting bar membership to Canadian citizens did not offend the Charter.1 71 In a
lengthy discourse on the fundamentals of interpretation of a constitutional
instrument, complete with quotations from Marbury v. Madison17 2 and McCulloch
both sides of a dispute are often referred to as rules of natural justice.”); Jeremy Waldron, Hart’s
Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83 N.Y.U. L. RE V. 1135, 1145 (2008) (referring to Hart’s rules of
natural justice as “the truly procedural principles”).
168
See Hogg, supra note 72, at 79, 83. The Court has occasionally resorted to originalism in order
to preserve a specific historic compromise, particularly in aboriginal cases. See, e.g., R. v. Blais,
[2003] S.C.R. 236 (holding based on historical context that the Métis are excluded from the
definition of “Indian” in the Manitoba Natural Resources Transfer Agreement); R. v. Van der
Peet, [1996] S.C.R. 507, 548 (holding it consistent with a purposive approach to interpretation to
declare that the aboriginal rights protected in § 35 of the Charter are not dynamic but refer to
traditions identifiable prior to aboriginal contact with Europeans); Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.R.
609 (refusing to extend state support for minority denominational schools in Ontario and Québec,
as established under the BNA Act, to other sectarian schools).
169
See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L. RE V.
747, 752 (1992); cf. Vazquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (“Our history does not impose
any rigid formula to constrain the disposition of cases.”).
170
See Morton & Knopff, supra note 95, at 533 (“While the living tree doctrine evolved in the
judicial interpretation of the [BNA Act], especially the law of federalism, no one has questioned
the appropriateness of transferring it to the Charter.”); cf. Raymond Bazowski, For the Love of
Justice? Judicial Review in Canada and the United States, in CONSTITU TION AL POLITICS IN
CAN AD A AND THE UN ITED S TATES , supra note 131 , at 223, 231 (“[A]lmost as soon as members of
the Supreme Court began to interpret the Charter, they announced their ambition to engage in a
purposive analysis of its clauses that would not be limited to an examination of legislative intent.
That this gesture earned no stern rebuke from the very legislatures that had just produced the
Charter testifies to a legislative acceptance of a noninterpretivist judicial strategy in Canada.”).
171
[1984] S.C.R. 357.
172
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

30

Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, forthcoming 88 Tex. L. Rev.

v. Maryland ,173 the Court stated that “[n]arrow and technical interpretation, if not
modulated by a sense of the unknowns of the future, can stunt the growth of the
law and hence the community it serves.” 174
More recently, the Court used the living tree analogy to uphold the
constitutionality of a federal law fixing a gender-neutral definition of marriage.175
Notwithstanding the obvious rights implications of the decision, it arose as a
federalism question: With characteristic opacity, the BNA Act places the subject
of “Marriage and Divorce” under the head of exclusive federal jurisdiction, while
“Solemnization of Marriage in the Province” is an exclusively provincial
matter.1 76 The Supreme Court found that this gave the federal government domain
over marriage capacity and the provinces domain over marriage performance. But
was the meaning of marriage the same as the common law definition circa 1867?
We now know enough about the Court to answer this question without even
reading the opinion. That is, as the Court wrote, “[t]he ‘frozen concepts’
reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian
constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a living tree which, by way
of progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern
life.” 177
3. Critics of Canadian Activism
The Supreme Court’s hostility to constitutional historicism and its
repeated incantations of the living tree metaphor do not seem to have damaged its
credibility with the public, nor are these significant concerns even of the Court’s
academic critics. There is little evidence of widespread Canadian opposition to the
Court’s exercise of power under the Charter’s auspices.178 A 2007 survey of
Canadians found that 54 percent of respondents thought the Supreme Court was
“moving our society in the right direction,” whereas 37 percent thought the Court
was moving society in the wrong direction. Remarkably, even among those in the
“wrong direction” cohort, opposition to the Court was not framed in terms of
judicial activism or the countermajoritarian difficulty familiar to U.S. discourse.
Asked the open -ended question of why they believed the Court was moving
society in the wrong direction, 25 percent expressed general dissatisfaction with
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17 U.S. (4 Wheaton’s) 316 (1819).
Skapinker, [1984] S.C.R. at 366.
175
See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.R. 698.
176
See Constitutional Act, 1867, §§ 91(26); 92(12).
177
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.R. at 710.
178
See MOR TON & KNOP FF , supra note 135, at 17.
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the Court’s work, and 26 percent suggested that the Court was soft on crime.179
The sorts of criticisms that tend to recur in books like Mark Levin’s Men in Black,
on talk radio, and at congressional hearings—“[o]ut of touch with mainstream
society” (4.6 percent); “[t]oo political” (3.5 percent); allowing abortion/same-sex
marriage (1.9 percent)—barely registered.180
None of which is to say that the Court is without its critics. The “activism”
of the Supreme Court of Canada is a frequent topic of discussion among
academics and politicians.1 81 But vanishingly few of the Court’s critics insist that
its members should be constrained by the historical meaning of the
Constitution.182 Indeed, two of the most prominent among them, F.L. Morton and
Rainer Knopff, argue that the Court’s incorporation of evolutionary principles
into constitutional interpretation is an error only of degree. They write, “We are
not opposed to all possible uses of the ‘living tree’ analogy, and our critique of its
more extreme version does not imply the acceptance of similarly extreme (and
simplistic) versions of the ‘original intent’ or ‘frozen concepts’ approaches to
constitutional interpretation.”183 Rather, Morton and Knopff invoke the Canadian
tradition of parliamentary supremacy to argue for greater deference to the
democratic decisionmaking of the whole, as against the narrow interests of
aboriginal groups and other minorities. They argue, echoing James Bradley
Thayer, that granting courts the power to render inconclusive the results of
democratic deliberation weakens the national commitment to robust
democracy.18 4 Theirs is, in that sense, a critique in the minimalist tradition.
Likewise, when the Supreme Court received an unusual and muchdiscussed rebuke in a unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeal of
Newfoundland and Labrador, Justice William Marshall made no reference to the
text, history, or structure of the Charter. The case, Newfoundland (Treasury
Board) v. Newfoundland Association of Public Employees, concerned whether the
Charter’s equality provision granted female public healthcare workers a right to
negotiated retroactive pay equity adjustments notwithstanding a legislative
179

The Court’s criminal procedure decisions have been its least popular, but complaints in this
area have not typically been originalist in nature. See, e.g., Celeste McGovern, Benevolent
Monarch , ALBER TA REP OR T, Sept. 21, 1998, at 20.
180
SES Research, 2007 Nationstate Omnibus Survey—Views on Supreme Court,
http://www.sesresearch.com/library/polls/POLNAT-W07-T219.pdf.
181
See KEN T RO ACH , THE SUP REM E COUR T O N T RIAL : JUD IC IAL AC TIVISM OR DEM OC R ATIC
DIALOGUE 74-80 (2001).
182
See Bazowski, supra note 170, at 230 (arguing that the American debate between
“interpretivists” and “noninterpretivists” does not “translate in the Canadian context quite the
same way, even though their political subtext is certainly not unknown in Canada”).
183
Morton & Knopff, supra note 95, at 544.
184
See MOR TON & KNOP FF , supra note 135, at 149 -166; cf. J AM ES BR ADLE Y TH AYER , JOHN
M ARSH ALL 107 (1901) (“[The] tendency of common and easy resort to [judicial review is] to
dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.”).
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determination that honoring the adjustments would violate a recently enacted
fiscal restraint law. 185 Justice Marshall argued that the Supreme Court had not
given sufficient attention to the doctrine of separation of powers in its
proportionality decisions under section 1 of the Charter: “it cannot be said that s.
1 endows the judiciary with license to stand in the shoes of the other branches of
government as ultimate arbitrator of which policy choices were in the best
interests of the governed.”186 The reason Justice Marshall believed that section 1
has been misapplied was not because of how it was intended or understood in
1982, but rather because he believed the Court was trampling on an unwritten
constitutional convention.187
***
Legal academics frequently argue that the debate over judicial activism in
the United States is hollow. The activist judge, after all, is the one who gets it
wrong.1 88 There being no shortage of Canadians who think the Supreme Court of
Canada gets cases wrong, and frequently so, the charge of judicial activism is a
familiar one north of the border. As Sheldon Pollack writes, “There has been a
comparable disagreement in Canada over divining and articulating rights under
the authority of the Charter.”1 89 What has not been comparable is the rhetoric of
the Courts’ critics. The substantial movement in the United States that views
judicial activism in terms of inattention to the original meaning of the
Constitution has no Canadian counterpart. Rather, both the Canadian judiciary
and its many critics have for much of the Charter’s history been “virtually
unanimous” in endorsing a “living tree” approach to articulating Charter rights.190
Canadian jurists apply the living tree metaphor not only to changes in fact—as,
185

220 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1 (2002).
Id . ¶ 362.
187
See id . ¶¶ 347 -49. The Supreme Court disagreed with Justice Marshall on appeal, stating
(without irony) that “the separation of powers cannot be invoked to undermine the operation of a
specific written provision of the Constitution like s. 1 of the Charter.” Newfoundland (Treasury
Board) v. Newfoundland Association of Public Employees, [2004] S.C.R. 381, ¶ 104.
188
See generally KERM IT ROO SE VEL T , T HE M YTH OF JUD IC IAL AC TIVISM (2006).
189
Sheldon D. Pollack, Constitutional Interpretation from Two Perspectives: Canada and the
United States, in CONSTITU TION AL POLITICS IN C AN AD A AND THE UNITED S TATES , supra note 131,
at 35, 37.
190
See DALE G IBSON , THE L AW O F THE CH AR TER —GENER AL PRINC IP LES 47 (1986); Jackson,
supra note 32, at 947. As Vicki Jackson observes, the living tree metaphor is not conceptually
identical to the “living Constitution” idea once more popular in American discourse. The anatomy
of a tree as root and branches “suggests that constitutional interpretation is constrained by the past,
but not entirely.” Jackson, supra , at 926, 943. In that sense, the analogy might compare more
favorably with Ronald Dworkin’s well-known chain-novel metaphor. See RON ALD DW ORK IN ,
L AW ’S EM P IRE 228-32 (1986).
186
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say, even an American originalist might view the application of the First
Amendment to broadcast television 191 —but to changes in the meaning of the
Constitution itself. 19 2
B. Australia’s Faint-Hearted Originalism
At first blush, the preferred approach of the High Court of Australia to
interpretation of its constitution is very nearly the mirror image of that of the
Supreme Court of Canada. Both courts began the last century quasi-committed to
British sovereignty but deeply committed to British modes of statutory
interpretation. In both countries a seminal Progressive Era judicial decision has
served as a reference point in most discussions of the degree to which
constitutional interpretation should be originalist or evolutionary, intentionalist or
purposive, large and liberal or narrow and conservative. But whereas Edwards
and the living tree metaphor it sprouted represent a departure from Canada’s
British origins, the case whose principles continue to set the terms of debate in
Australian constitutional law is rather a symbol of British continuity. Thus, in
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Company (the
Engineers Case), Justice Higgins wrote:
The fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are
subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent of
the Parliament that made it; and that intention has to be found by an
examination of the language used in the statute as a whole. The question
is, what does the language mean; and when we find what the language
means, in its ordinary and natural sense, it is our duty to obey that
meaning, even if we think the result to be inconvenient or impolitic or
improbable.1 93
As I discuss below, the literalist approach taken in the Engineers Case, which
treats the Australian Constitution like the British statute that it is, was the
dominant approach of the High Court until Anthony Mason became Chief Judge
in 1987, roughly coinciding with Australian constitutional sovereignty one year
earlier. It remains rhetorically potent today. As Brad Selway has written, “In
contrast to the various divergent approaches that exist in United States
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See, e.g., SC AL IA, supra note 11, at 45.
See Morton & Knopff, supra note 95, at 539-40.
193
(1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 161 -62 (Higgins, J.); see generally PHILIP HAM BURGE R , L AW AND
JUDICIAL DU TY 47-58 (describing the common law roots of reliance on the authority of the “intent
of the act”).
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jurisprudence, all Australian High Court judges are likely to be viewed as being
fundamentally texualists.” 1 9 4
Part of the reason why Australia would have taken to purposive, valueladen, or evolutionary jurisprudence much later than Canada seems obvious. First,
Australia lacks a bill of rights. The few enumerated rights in the Australian
Constitution generally apply only against the federal government;195 adjudicating
constitutional disputes, much less those involving individual rights, is a relatively
minor chore for the Court.1 96 Second, unlike in Canada, the upshot of High Court
literalism was strong deference to the power of the Commonwealth in federalism
disputes. Taken in combination, those two considerations suggest a hypothesis: If
narrow textualism threatened neither the power of the national government nor
the articulation of rights, it is unclear that it ever would have fallen out of favor in
either Canada or the United States.
But the case is more complex than that. Australian literalism, “legalism”
in its more sophisticated and plenary form, is more broadly practiced but less
reactionary and less historicist than American originalism. As we shall see,
legalism is an exercise in judgment, not a salve for it.
1. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
The Australian Constitution was the product of a domestically convened
constitutional convention spanning 1897 to 1899 at which each of the six colonies
was represented. The resulting Constitution was submitted for referendum within
each colony and was submitted to the Parliament at Westminster for approval in
1900. The final version was little changed by Parliament and went into effect as
the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act on January 1, 1901. The
Constitution established a tripartite federal system of government, with a
legislative, executive, and judicial branch, although by convention the executive
is under the control of the national legislature. The principal federalism -related
194

Justice B.M. Selway, Methodologies of Constitutional Interpretation in the High Court of
Australia, 14 PUBLIC L. RE V. 234, 239 (2003).
195
The constitutionally enshrined individual rights are the rights to just terms in the event of a
taking of property, AUS TL . CONS T . § 51(xxxi); to criminal trial by jury, id . § 80; and to freedom of
religion, id . § 116. The Constitution also guarantees that those qualified to vote in state elections
shall also be qualified to vote in Commonwealth elections, id . § 41, but the scope of this provision
has been limited through judicial interpretation. State governments are forbidden from
discriminating against residents of other states. Id . § 117.
196
Constitutional cases rarely comprise more than 10 percent of the Court’s annual docket, see
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Australia: Devotion to Legalism, in INTERP RE TING CON S TITU TION S: A
COM P ARATIVE S TUD Y, supra note 69, at 106, 113, and rights cases are not dominant within that
category, see Sir Anthony Mason, The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A
Comparison of the Australian and the United States Experience, 16 FED . L. RE V. 1, 13 (1986).
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provisions are sections 51 and 52, which enumerate the powers of the Parliament,
and sections 106-120, which include a supremacy clause and a full faith and credit
clause, and which grant certain affirmative powers and impose certain limitations
on state governments.
Like the U.S. counterpart on which it was modeled, the Australian
Constitution does not expressly provide for judicial review, but there is evidence
that the power to review legislation for constitutionality was assumed.19 7 The
High Court is a constitutional creation, its composition and jurisdiction the subject
of Chapter 3 of the Constitution. The Court began to sit in 1903, when Parliament
conferred jurisdiction upon it to decide constitutional cases. Its constitutional
jurisdiction permits it to hear appeals from both lower federal courts and from
state courts (including state-law issues), although today its jurisdiction is limited
to discretionary appeals “in cases raising difficult issues of national
importance.”198
The Constitution also provides for the possibility of appeal to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. 1 99 Significantly, however, in cases involving an
inter se federalism question, appeal to the Privy Council from High Court
decisions originally required certification from the High Court itself. 200 The Court
certified only one question, in 1913, 201 before most appeals to the Privy Council
were abolished in 1968. 202 Direct appeals from state courts were not
constitutionally barred, but the High Court ruled in 1907 that it was not bound by
any Privy Council decisions on inter se affairs, even when the Committee
properly had jurisdiction.20 3 The state-court loophole was subsequently closed
when the British Parliament provided in 1907 that the High Court’s jurisdiction
over inter se matters was exclusive of the state supreme courts’.204 As a practical
matter, then, the Privy Council has had very little effect on the development of
Australian constitutional law. 2 05
Amendments to the Australian Constitution require passage in Parliament
and approval through referendum of the majority of voters nationwide and in a
197

See Goldsworthy, supra note 196, at 110; see also Australian Communist Party v.
Commonwealth, (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 262 (Fullagar, J.) (“[I]n our system the principle of Marbury
v. Madison is accepted as axiomatic.”).
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Judicial Amendment Act (No. 2), 1984 (Austl.).
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AU S TL . CON S T. § 73.
Id . § 74.
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See Attorney General (Cth.) v. Colonial Sugar Ref. Co. Ltd., [1914] A.C. 237 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Austl.).
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Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act, 1968 (Austl.).
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See Baxter v. Comm’rs of Taxation, (1907) 4 C.LR. 1087.
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Amendments to the Judiciary Act, 1903 (Aust.) (No. 8 1907); see LES LIE Z INES , COW EN AND
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majority of the states.2 06 Although on paper the amendment process is easier than
in either the United States or Canada, constitutional amendment has not in
practice been a significant avenue of constitutional revision in Australia. 20 7
2. Legalism at the Bar of the High Court
The interesting question of the extent to which judges should apply the
same methods of interpretation to constitutions as to statutes is more interesting
still in countries with an ongoing tradition of parliamentary supremacy. It may be
that we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding, but the
question was more complicated early in Australia’s constitutional history. The
Australian Constitution is a statute, after all, and not even an Australian statute at
that. It would have seemed obvious to many turn of the century Commonwealth
jurists that the text, narrowly construed, fixed the intentions of the British MPs
whose assent was relevant to the status of the Constitution as law.
And indeed it was obvious to many. In Tasmania v. Commonwealth , the
High Court was called upon to decide a dispute over customs duties in which it
was claimed that an ambiguity in one section of the Constitution should be read in
accordance with common sense rather than so as to conform, arguably absurdly,
to another section.20 8 Put another way, by Chief Justice Samuel Griffith,
We were invited by [Tasmania’s counsel] to apply, in construing
the Constitution, some higher rule of construction; to look beyond the
letter of the Constitution; to adopt something which would commend itself
to our minds as being a principle of abstract justice, and if possible to read
the Constitution in conformity with that principle. 2 09
Griffith’s words carry special weight in Australia, as he is often described as the
father of its Constitution, but he was careful to describe the document as an Act of
Parliament, to which “the same rules of interpretation apply that apply to any
other written document.”21 0 Namely, the rules were to be those that the House of
Lords applies to statutes. First, “they should be construed according to the intent
of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the Statute are in
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themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to
expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense.”21 1
Second, a court tasked with interpreting either a statute or a constitution
should not “decide such a question . . . under the influence of considerations of
policy, except so far as that policy may be apparent from, or at least consistent
with, the language of the legislature in the Statute or Statutes upon which the
question depends.”212 The other two judges hearing the Tasmania case, writing
seriatim, agreed with Griffith. Justice Barton wrote:
It would be an enormity to hold that a Judge who thinks that a
certain course, laid down with apparent clearness in an Act of Parliament,
is absurd, may use every means to get rid of that literal meaning which, to
the minds of responsible legislators, who were in an equal position to
judge of its absurdity, appeared to be reasonable. 21 3
Justice O’Connor added that, in his view, “it [cannot] be too strongly stated that
our duty in interpreting a Statute is to declare and administer the law according to
the intention expressed in the Statute itself. In this respect the Constitution differs
in no way from any Statute of the Commonwealth or of a State.” 214
Students of the debate on the modern U.S. Supreme Court over statutory
interpretation will recognize the voice of Justice Scalia. 21 5 He has also suggested
that so far as the text is clear, it is a complete statement of legislative intent, for
“[m]en may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which
bind us.”2 16 It has long been thought by most American judges and scholars that
such a rigid rule of interpretation has no place in constitutional law. 21 7 That
211

Id . at 339 (quoting Sussex Peerage Case, (1844) 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1057 (H.L.) (Tindal,
L.C.J.)).
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Id . (quoting Hardy v. Fothergill, [1888] 13 App. Cas. 351, 358 (Selborne)).
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Id . at 346 -47 (Barton, J.).
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Id . at 358 (O’Connor, J.).
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Compare Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1549 (2007) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (“As long as [the] driving policy [behind policy-driven interpretation] is faithful to
the intent of Congress . . . —which it must be if it is to override a strict interpretation of the text—
the decision is also a correct performance of the judicial function.”), with id . at 1557 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Contrary to the Court and Justice Stevens, I do not believe that what we are sure the
Legislature meant to say can trump what it did say.”).
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SC AL IA, supra note 11, at 17.
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The classic statement is John Marshall’s: “A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be
carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
Justice Scalia agrees that constitutions are different, but in degree only. See SC AL IA, supra note
11, at 37 (“In textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells
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suggestion rests on one or both of two assumptions, first, that a constitution meant
to endure over time cannot possibly specify in advance how it should apply to
unforeseen circumstances, and second, that a constitution is difficult to amend and
so must be tethered to the contemporary will of the people in the course of
judicial review. Accepting the first assumption suggests the “large and liberal”
interpretation recommended in Edwards, and accepting the second means that,
pace Chief Justice Griffith, constitutional judges should pay some attention to
“considerations of policy.” Where the constitution is in fact a statute of a quasiforeign sovereign, either assumption rests on shakier footing. A constitution that
doubles as ordinary legislation might be presumed to lack the intransigence of a
higher-law document, and one tethered ab initio to the will of foreigners
challenges the democratic premise of the two assumptions. What a foreign
sovereign giveth it conceivably may take away.
The High Court’s abandonment of special rules of interpretation for the
Constitution, evidenced in the Tasmania case, was sanctified in the Engineers
Case. At issue was whether a federal arbitration award could be applied against a
state. As in the United States during roughly the same era,21 8 the High Court
carefully scrutinized the (porous) boundary between interstate and intrastate
authority in a series of cases during the first two decades of the twentieth century.
And as in the United States,21 9 the Court’s federalism decisions were difficult to
predict in advance. Thus, the Court held in 1904 that the state of Tasmania could
not tax the salary of a federal officer even though section 107 of the Constitution
grants the power of taxation to the states and does not expressly limit that
power.220 Barely a decade later the Court upheld a Queensland statute taxing
leasehold estates in federal land.221 Both decisions employed the structural,
purposive, and extratextual reasoning that the Engineers Case sought to end.
Rather than engage in the guesswork required of such reasoning, Justice Isaacs
wrote that the Court’s task in constitutional interpretation was “faithfully to
expound and give effect to [the Constitution] according to its own terms, finding
the intention from the words of the compact, and upholding it throughout
precisely as framed, clear of any qualifications which the people of the
us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow
interpretation—though not an interpretation that the language will not bear.”)
218
See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating a federal tax on
manufacturing income derived from child labor); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)
(invalidating congressional regulation of interstate commerce in the products of child labor);
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (invalidating application of the Sherman Act
to consolidation of sugar manufacturing).
219
Compare Hammer, 247 U.S. 251, with Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding
federal authority over interstate transportation of lottery tickets).
220
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Commonwealth or, at their request, the Imperial Parliament have not thought fit to
express.”2 22 The alternative, he said, was “referable to no more definite standard
than the personal opinion of the judge who declares it.” 2 23
The Engineers Case is an immensely important landmark in Australia’s
constitutional jurisprudence for two interrelated reasons. First, in upholding the
federal arbitration award the Court vanquished the concept of implied
intergovernmental immunities. 2 24 Second, and most germane to our enquiry, the
case expressly established that interpretation of the Australian Constitution would
follow a British model of statutory interpretation rather than an American model
of constitutional interpretation. The High Court would henceforward obey “the
settled rules of construction which . . . have been very distinctly enunciated by the
highest tribunals of the [British] Empire.” 225 To wit, “[t]he first, and ‘golden rule’
or ‘universal rule’” was that judges interpreting a statute should:

[E]xclude consideration of everything excepting the state of the
law as it was when the statute was passed, and the light to be got by
reading it as a whole, before attempting to construe any particular section.
Subject to this consideration . . . the only safe course is to read the
language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense.2 26
Specifically with respect to interpretation of a written Constitution, the
rule would be:

“ [I]f the text is explicit the text is conclusive, alike in what it
directs and what it forbids. When the text is ambiguous, as, for example,
when the words establishing two mutually exclusive jurisdictions are wide
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rights in federalism cases, see, e.g., Webb v. Outtrim, [1907] A.C. 81 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Vict.) (holding that Commonwealth officers were subject to state income tax), but disempowered
to review inter se federalism questions, the Committee’s views on the matter were far less relevant
in Australia.
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Engineers Case, 28 C.L.R. at 148.
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Id . at 149 (quoting Vacher’s Case, [1913] A.C. 107, 113 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng. &
Wales) (U.K.) (Haldane, L.C.)).
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enough to bring a particular power within either, recourse must be had to
the context and scheme of the Act.”227
Put differently, interpretation of the Australian Constitution would be by
reference to its plain text, structure, and statutory context. In the service of
judicial restraint, any reference to the intentions of the drafters was strictly
forbidden.
Variants on this approach to constitutional interpretation go by various
names around the world —originalism being one of them —but Australians call it
legalism. And it has had a distinguished pedigree since the Engineers Case. At his
1952 swearing-in as Chief Justice of the High Court, Owen Dixon said, “It may
be that the court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I should be sorry to think
that it is anything else. There is no other safe guide to judicial decisions in great
conflicts than a strict and complete legalism.”228 From the time of the Engineers
Case roughly until Australian constitutional sovereignty, it was orthodoxy on the
High Court to interpret the Constitution according to the “ordinary or technical
meaning” of the text, to refuse to expand or limit that meaning by reference to the
purpose of a given provision or of the Constitution as a whole, and to “accept[]
that, unless formally amended, the words of the Constitution continue to mean
what they meant in 1900.” 2 29
That is not to say that the Australian Constitution is wholly impervious to
technological innovation or changes in social fact. The Court has held and
continues to maintain that “[t]he connotation of words employed in the
Constitution does not change though changing events and attitudes may in some
227

Id . at 150 (quoting AG Ontario v. AG Canada , [1912] A.C. 571, 583 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Can.) (Loreburn, L.C.)).
228
Swearing In of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice of the High Court, 85 C.L.R. xi, xiv (1952).
Cf. SC AL IA, supra note 11, at 25 (“Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most
mindless is that it is ‘formalistic.’ The answer to that is, of course it’s formalistic! The rule of law
is about form.”).
229
Goldsworthy, supra note 196, at 121 -22, 136; see Attorney-General v. Commonwealth, (1981)
146 C.L.R. 559, 614-15 (Mason, J.) (“[A] constitutional prohibition must be applied in accordance
with the meaning which it had in 1900.”); Commonwealth v. Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case),
(1983) 158 C.L.R. 1, 127 (“[M]ere expectations held in 1900 could not form a satisfactory basis
for departing from the natural interpretation of words used in the Constitution.”); S. Australia v.
Commonwealth (First Uniform Tax Case), (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373 (upholding a federal taxation
scheme whose obvious purpose and effect was to deprive states of their constitutionally
guaranteed right to impose income taxes); see also Craven, supra note 6, at 171 (“[T]he dominant
interpretative ideology of the Court has been, at least since Engineers, some variant of more or
less strict legalism.”); David Tucker, Textualism: An Australian Evaluation of the Debate Between
Professor Ronald Dworkin and Justice Antonin Scalia , 21 SYDNE Y L. RE V . 567, 579-80 (1991)
(“[T]he ‘take-the-accepted-meaning of a term’ rule of interpretation adopted in Engineers has
proved remarkably resilient in guiding the High Court’s work for most of this century.”).
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circumstances extend the denotation or reach of those words.”230 The High Court
has frequently relied upon the distinction between the “connotation” of the
Constitution’s text—its meaning as of 1900—and its “denotation”—the category
of objects to which that meaning applies. 231 Justice Dawson has said that the
Court’s idiosyncratic usage derives from that of John Stuart Mill, who in A System
of Logic described a “connotative term” as “one which denotes a subject, and
implies an attribute,” as “white” might denote the color of snow.232 As used on the
High Court, the distinction parallels the familiar distinction in American
constitutional theory between original semantic meaning and original expected
application.2 33 So just as an American originalist might allow that the Fourth
Amendment forbids wiretapping, 234 the High Court held in 1935 that radio
broadcasts constitute “telephonic, telegraphic and other like services” while
admitting no embarrassment to its legalist credentials. 235 As if to prove the
resiliency of those credentials, however, the Court held in 1972 that section 41 of
the Constitution, which guarantees the franchise in federal elections to “adult
persons” who may vote in state elections, only applies to those who were
considered adults in 1901—i.e., 21-year-olds—not to those who are of adult age
under current state law. 236
On its face, then, Australian legalism appears to mirror the form of
originalism promoted by Justice Scalia, mapped onto the entire Court.237 Like
Justice Scalia in statutory cases, the pre-1986 High Court refused outright to
consult legislative debates either to reveal legislative purpose or as an aid in
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ascertaining the contemporaneous meaning of the text.238 Even when the Court
finally reversed its blanket rule, it said that it would thereafter refer to legislative
debates “not for the purpose of substituting for the meaning of the words used the
scope and effect—if such could be established —which the founding fathers
subjectively intended the section to have, but for the purpose of identifying the
contemporary meaning of language used [and] the subject to which that language
was directed.” 2 39 Likewise, Justice Scalia has suggested that ratification history
may assist the originalist judge in ascertaining the original meaning of the
Constitution’s text.2 40
As we shall see, however, the High Court’s consideration of Convention
debates, which has increased dramatically in the years since constitutional
sovereignty ,2 41 is of a different order than Justice Scalia’s use of ratification
history to divine original meaning. The Great Divide in Australia is not between
original meaning and current meaning but between original meaning and original
intent. Use of legislative debates, then, represents a momentous departure from
orthodox Australian legalism. In combination with other innovations of the
Mason Court, the turn to extrinsic evidence has contributed to a palpable tension
between the Court’s legalist tradition and its potentially purposive future.
3. The Mason Court Revolution
Like Canada and New Zealand, Australia became fully patriated in the
1980s. The Statute of Westminster, 1931 had liberated the Commonwealth to
legislate extraterritorially and ended the repugnancy doctrine, whereby Australian
laws would be invalidated if they conflicted with United Kingdom law. But, with
consent, the British Parliament still had authority to legislate for Australia, and the
states remained bound by the repugnancy and extraterritoriality doctrines.
Moreover, as of the 1980s the Privy Council still had the constitutional power to
adjudicate appeals from the Supreme Courts of the various states. That all ended
with the Australia Act 1986. The Act, which comprised joint statutes of the
British and Australian Parliaments, effectively severed all remaining legal ties
between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth.242
238

See Goldsworthy, supra note 196, at 123-24; see, e.g., A-G ex rel Black v. Commonwealth,
(1981) 146 C.L.R. 559; A-G (Cth); ex rel McKinlay v. Commonwealth, (1975) 135 C.L.R. 1.
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Australian constitutional independence nearly perfectly coincided with the
ascendancy of Anthony Mason to the position of Chief Justice of the High Court
in 1987. Mason had not been thought a particularly reform-minded jurist during
his 15 years on the High Court prior to his tenure as Chief Justice, but his impact
as Chief is perhaps best expressed by political scientist Jason Pierce’s conclusion
based on more than 80 interviews with Australian appellate judges: “Australia’s
appellate judges tend to speak in ‘then and now’ terms regarding the High Court,
such that the ‘then’ encompassed the years from federation to the mid -1980s,
while the ‘now’ meant the years since the mid -1980s.’”243 According to Mason’s
former colleague Justice McHugh, Mason viewed constitutional sovereignty as
more than simply a change in the formal status of the Commonwealth’s
relationship with the United Kingdom but rather as a mandate to conceptualize
constitutional interpretation and rights-formation in broader terms.244
With the help of relatively reform -minded colleagues such as William
Deane, Mary Gaudron, and John Toohey, Mason inaugurated a departure from the
strict legalism associated with the Engineers Case and with Chief Justice
Dixon.245 Mason, Deane, and Gaudron had all been educated at the University of
Sydney, where, according to Jeffrey Goldsworthy, they were exposed to “more
pragmatic, consequentialist legal theories” than many of their predecessors.246
Accordingly, the Mason Court was more willing to engage in purposive analysis;
more willing to find implied rights within the constitutional structure; more
willing to allow for constitutional evolution; and increasingly likely to look to
transnational sources for constitutional wisdom.
In a speech given one year before he became Chief Justice, Mason
announced what he perceived to be an emerging trend in Australian constitutional
law, namely a “move[] away from ‘strict and complete legalism’ and toward a
more policy oriented constitutional interpretation.” 24 7 Most would agree that the
statement was more predictive than descriptive. Two years later, in its unanimous
per curiam in Cole v. Whitfield , the case in which the Court explicitly abandoned
its rule against reference to Convention debates, the Court warned of “the hazards
of seeking certainty of operation of a constitutional guarantee through the medium
of an artificial formula. Either the formula is consistently applied and subverts the
substance of the guarantee; or an attempt is made to achieve uniformly
243

PIERCE , supra note 237 , at 42; accord Goldsworthy, supra note 196, at 144 (“It is generally
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satisfactory outcomes and the formula becomes uncertain in its application.”248
Sophisticated observers recognized the announcement of a more open embrace of
policy-balancing and purposive interpretation.24 9 And indeed the decision itself
held that section 92 of the Constitution —providing that “[o]n the imposition of
uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, . .
. shall be absolutely free” 2 50 —does not quite mean what it says. The Court held
that Convention debates revealed that the purpose behind the provision was not to
allow “anarchy” in trade but to prevent “discriminatory burdens of a protectionist
kind.” 2 51 In limiting the text of section 92 to the scope consistent with its
historical purpose, the Court overruled some 127 cases and, it should be noted,
took the Stevens side of the interpretive debate at the heart of Heller. 25 2
There was much more to the Mason Court revolution. As discussed above,
Australia’s Constitution guarantees precious few individual rights. But Lionel
Murphy’s appointment to the Court in 1975 produced consistent calls for
recognizing a variety of implied constitutional rights, most prominently including
the right to political communication.253 The argument, very much in the spirit of
Charles Black, was that the Constitution’s provisions for parliamentary elections
and representative state governments implied a basic freedom to express political
ideas. 25 4 Miller v. TCN Channel Nine, involving a prosecution for a television
station’s use of an unauthorized transmitter for an interstate broadcast, presented
the Court with an opportunity to declare such an implied right in 1986. Justice
Murphy reiterated his view that such a right exists but the other six Justices
resolved the case on alternative grounds.255
Six years later, however, following constitutional sovereignty, five
Justices were prepared to announce an implied freedom of political
communication. Wrote Justice Brennan in Nationwide News v. Wills, “Freedom of
public discussion of government (including the institutions and agencies of
248
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government) is not merely a desirable political privilege; it is inherent in the idea
of a representative democracy.”25 6 In the companion case of Australian Capital
Television v. Commonwealth , Chief Justice Mason acknowledged that the
founding generation had deliberately omitted judicially enforceable individual
rights from the Constitution, preferring to leave rights enforcement to the
principle of responsible government.257 Crucially, however, that decision was
made before 1986, which “marked the end of the legal sovereignty of the Imperial
Parliament and recognized that ultimate sovereignty resided in the Australian
people.”25 8 Under the new populist order, parliamentary representatives “are
accountable to the people for what they do and have a responsibility to take
account of the views of the people on whose behalf they act. . . . Indispensable to
that responsibility is freedom of communication, at least in relation to public
affairs and political discussion .”259 The implication was that the right did not exist
on the day of federation but arose incident to the sort of democracy the Australian
nation had become.
The cat thus out of the bag, the Court wielded the right of political
communication to erect a constitutional defense to defamation in Theophanous v.
Herald & Weekly Times.2 60 And in Leeth v. Commonwealth , three Justices were of
the view that the Constitution contained an implied individual right to equal
treatment under the law. 2 61 To an American audience the hue and cry the Court’s
implied freedoms cases sparked in Australian legal circles will seem like much
ado about very little. But against the backdrop of Australian legal norms, judicial
creativity of this sort was exceptionally rare prior to constitutional independence.
In addition to engaging more frequently in purposive analysis and
occasionally finding implied individual rights in the Constitution, the Mason
Court was more openly willing to allow that the Constitution may adapt to
changed circumstances. The boundary between connotation and denotation has
never been airtight, and many Australian court watchers believe that even the
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committed legalist has often been able to squeeze his way through just fine. 262 But
in select cases the Mason Court was unusually open about constitutional updating.
Thus, in Street v. Queensland Bar Association , the Court had to decide
whether the State of Queensland could restrict bar admission to state residents,
notwithstanding sections 92 and 117 of the Constitution, which generally prohibit
interstate discrimination. 263 The Court had held in a prior case, Henry v. Boehm,
that those constitutional provisions did not apply because the challenged statute
did not require anyone to abandon her domicile. 264 Following the pre-Mason
Court preference for formal rules over balancing tests, the Henry Court held
moreover that the discriminatory character of a state law should be determined by
its formal operation rather than by its practical effect. 265 The High Court reversed
Henry outright, with Chief Justice Mason writing inter alia that “[i]t would make
little sense to deal with laws which have a discriminatory purpose and leave
untouched laws which have a discriminatory effect.” 2 66 It had long been thought
that permitting judges to look beyond the face of a statute to its actual operation
would interfere with legislative prerogatives and destabilize constitutional
interpretation: a statute thought constitutional at time T0 could become
unconstitutional at time T1 , solely through judicial assessment of social facts.267
The Court expressed no such concern in Street .
More recently, in Sue v. Hill, the Court held that British subjects were
citizens of a “foreign power” under section 44(i) of the Constitution and therefore
could not be members of Parliament.26 8 The controversy stems from the fact that
the United Kingdom was not a foreign power in 1901. The Court’s lead opinion
stated that “[w]hilst the text of the Constitution has not changed, its operation has.
. . . The Constitution speaks to the present and its interpretation takes account of
and moves with these developments.”2 69 Notably, the Court said so without any
reference to its connotation-denotation distinction, which seems a natural fit for
the case. This language was sufficiently alarming that Justice Callinan, who voted
to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds, wrote a concurring opinion in which
262
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he called into question the petitioner’s “evolutionary theory” of the case as
introducing too much uncertainty into the law.27 0
Relying upon Sue v. Hill among other cases, Justice Michael Kirby has
articulated what he calls a “living force” theory that, as of 2000, he believed was
“gradually emerging as the theory proper to the construction of the
Constitution.”27 1 Kirby suggests that High Court case law over the last two
decades is slowly conforming to the view of constitutional interpretation held by
Andrew Inglis Clark, a leader in the Australian federation movement who also
happened to be an expert on the U.S. Constitution and a friend of Oliver Wendell
Holmes.27 2 His writings on Australian interpretation resembled Holmes’s later
opinion in Missouri v. Holland :
The social conditions and the political exigencies of the succeeding
generations of every civilized and progressive community will inevitably
produce new governmental problems to which the language of the
Constitution must be applied, and hence it must be read and construed, not
as containing a declaration of the will and intentions of men long since
dead . . . but as declaring the will and intentions of the present inheritors
and possessors of sovereign power, who maintain the Constitution and
have the power to alter it, and who are in the immediate presence of the
problems to be solved. It is they who enforce the provisions of the
Constitution and make a living force of that which would otherwise be a
silent and lifeless document.273
Three different Justices, including Kirby himself, have cited favorably to Clark’s
“living force” theory in High Court opinions, although as I discuss below it does
not command a majority on the current Court.274
The final piece to the Mason Court’s constitutional law revolution —in
addition to purposive analysis, recognition of implied constitutional rights, and
explicitly evolutionary jurisprudence—is incorporation of transnational legal
sources into Australian constitutional law. Given that Australia was only quasisovereign at federation and modeled its Constitution expressly on that of the
United States, it is to be expected that reference to foreign law has a long pedigree
270
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in Australian jurisprudence.27 5 But citations to cases of foreign nations other than
the United Kingdom accelerated dramatically in the 1980s. American cases, for
example, were cited in 13 percent of High Court decisions in the 1970s, compared
to 25 percent in the 1980s and 41 percent in the 1990s. Canadian cases were cited
in just 10 percent of High Court decisions in the 1970s, but 21 percent in the
1980s and 37 percent in the 1990s. 276 Cases from the constitutional courts of
South Africa, New Zealand, and India are also much more frequently cited than in
years past, as are international conventions and legal norms.2 77
American originalists are apt to point out that reference to contemporary
foreign and international law to define the substance and scope of constitutional
provisions is difficult to reconcile with traditional forms of originalism.2 78 But in
Australian Capital Television , for example, several High Court Justices
articulated limitations on the implied freedom of political communication by
reference to precedents of the United States Supreme Court and the European
Court of Human Rights rather than to any original understanding particular to the
Australian tradition.279 Where aids to interpretation once could not be extrinsic to
the text of the Constitution, they now may be extrinsic to the Commonwealth
itself.
4. The Gleeson Counterrevolution
Controversy has attended virtually all of the changes introduced during
Chief Justice Mason’s tenure. Few would doubt, moreover, that the Court
backtracked, arguably a great deal, during the recent tenure of Murray Gleeson as
Chief Justice. Gleeson was a classmate of former Liberal Party Prime Minister
John Howard’s at the University of Sydney, and Howard appointed Gleeson to the
Chief Justiceship in 1998. Australia’s Liberal Party is misleadingly named, as its
liberalism is more Friedman than Rawls: it is associated with laissez faire
economics and social conservatism. Gleeson brought that conservatism with him
to the High Court. Directly contrary to the themes of the Mason Court, Gleeson
has written that “the members of the Court are expected to approach their task by
275
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the application of what Sir Owen Dixon described as ‘a strict and complete
legalism.’”280
Gleeson’s account is hortatory. The battle for the soul of the High Court
over the last decade has been open and notorious. The Court’s conservatives, in
the persons of Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Callinan, have sought to curtail
much of the discretion inherent in the Mason Court reforms, while more liberal
members, Justice Kirby most persistently, have sought instead to broaden it. Singh
v. Commonwealth is emblematic. 2 81 Section 51(xix) of the Constitution empowers
Parliament to legislate with respect to “naturalization and aliens.”282 Tania Singh
was born in Australia to undocumented Indian parents. Although Australia does
not confer automatic birthright citizenship, Singh argued that she was
nevertheless not an “alien” and therefore could not be deported pursuant to a
statute enacted under the authority of section 51(xix).
Chief Justice Gleeson’s opinion in Singh includes a lengthy discourse, far
longer than any in the U.S. Reports, on the nature of constitutional interpretation.
It should by now be clear that such discourse is not unusual in High Court
opinions, which are issued seriatim and are therefore more personal than the
typically antiseptic majority opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Gleeson’s view
is an orthodox originalist one: “Judicial review of the validity of legislative action
by reference to the Constitution is conducted upon the hypothesis that the terms,
express and implied, of a written instrument, brought into existence more than a
century ago, bind present and future parliaments, and courts.”283 The meaning of
those terms would be determined not by modern exigencies but by “the
contemporary meaning of the language used in 1900.” 284 Here, it was clear to
Gleeson that as of 1900 the Parliament had the authority to determine the scope of
alienage and not merely of citizenship. Concurring, Justice Callinan warned
against overuse of the connotation -denotation distinction: “Judges should in my
opinion be especially vigilant to recognise and eschew what is in substance a
constitutional change under a false rubric of a perceived change in the m eaning of
a word, or an expression used in the Constitution.”285
Justice Kirby agreed with Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Callinan in
result but engaged them directly on constitutional interpretation. He referred to
the theory that constitutional text should receive “the same meaning and intent
with which [the Constitution] spoke when it came from the hands of its framers,
and was voted on and adopted by the people,” and placed those words in the
280
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mouth of Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford .286 Because a constitution
must endure through the ages, Kirby said, “the ambit of the power [of
interpretation] is not limited by the wishes, expectations or imagination of the
framers. They did not intend, nor did they enjoy the power, to impose their wishes
and understanding of the text upon later generations of Australians.” 287 Justice
Kirby ultimately concluded that Parliament had the power to declare Singh an
alien, but he did so by reference to the chameleonic nature of the term “alien;” to
international law norms of dual and birthright citizenship; to the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; to precedent; and to potential policy
consequences.288
These battle lines recur elsewhere. In McGinty v. Western Australia ,
decided in the brief interregnum between the Mason and Gleeson Courts,289
Justice McHugh and Justice Toohey jousted over whether a freestanding principle
of representative democracy underlies the Constitution and may be given dynamic
content by judges.2 90 In Re Wakim; Ex Parte McNally , Justice McHugh and
Justice Kirby locked horns over the role convenience and policy should play in
determining whether Parliament had the power to vest jurisdiction in federal
courts to decide issues of state law, a matter on which the Constitution is silent.291
In Eastman v. The Queen and Brownlee v. The Queen , both criminal procedure
cases, Justices McHugh and Kirby were at it again, delivering lengthy and
detailed opinions on the relative merits of originalism and “living force”
constitutionalism. 29 2 In each of those cases, the “living force” view was in dissent,
leading most observers to conclude that the Gleeson Court had successfully
reinvigorated Australian legalism.293
Reinvigorated but not reinaugurated. All that is orthodox on the High
Court today is that, relative to the past, little is orthodox. The lasting legacy of the
Mason Court is not that it made Australian constitutional interpretation purposive
but that it made it, like ours, pluralistic. Throughout his battles with Justice Kirby,
Justice McHugh maintained that the High Court employs the many tools available
to common law judges in its constitutional decisions:
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The common law constitutional method is a house of many rooms.
It emphasizes text and the drawing of constitutional implications from the
text and structure of the Constitution. It relies heavily on previous
authorities and the doctrines associated with those authorities. It uses
history, particularly for ascertaining the purpose of particular
constitutional provisions. But it recognises that none of these tools—
including textual analysis—may be decisive. . . . And since the beginning
of the Mason Court, where the constitutional text is not compelling, as is
often the case, it takes into account conflicting social interests, values and
policies in seeking to give the Constitution a construction that accords
with the needs of contemporary Australia. 294
This approach has become relatively common ground among High Court
Justices.29 5 Recognition of its own pluralism brings the Court into line with much
of the world,2 96 but it represents monumentally different rhetoric from what
prevailed two decades ago.29 7 The Court as a whole remains more enamored of
text and original meaning than a typical European, Canadian, or even American
jurist, but its originalism is, as Justice McHugh has said, “faint-hearted.”2 98 It is
text-focused but not fetishistic; it is able to accommodate extrinsic evidence and
willing openly to consider the policy implications of a too -literal reading of the
document.299
***
Australian jurists have long been and to a great extent remain “originalist.”
The reaction of the Australian bench to the Mason Court revolution has been stark
and, in significant respects, negative. Pierce’s study begins with an accounting of
some of the colorful adjectives used by the judges he interviewed to describe the
Mason Court: “hyperactive,” “adventurous,” “incomparably activist,” “composed
294
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of judicial legislators,” “controlled by Jacobins,” “under the influence of left-wing
theorists,” “deciding cases as Marx or Freud would have,” and “overcome with
delusions of grandeur.”3 00 It is my impression as an American constitutional
scholar that the rhetoric in U.S. legal circles is less heated, even though the
Supreme Court itself is less text-bound, more creative, and more pluralistic than
the High Court of Australia.
As I discussed in Part II.B.2, however, the Great Divide in Australia is
different than it is here. American scholars, not to mention the lay public, tend to
lump together original intent and original meaning as two different ways of
practicing a methodology whose essential features they share: attention to a fixed
historical meaning as a tool for restraining judges. History is linked to judicial
restraint. But it is recognized (and feared) in Australia that history can do much
more than that. It can provide clues as to original purposes and expectations, can
alter both the connotation and the denotation of constitutional text, and can even
change the holistic purposes of constitutionalism itself. In that sense, history can
be generative rather than constraining. As Justice McHugh has written, even the
conservative Gleeson Court “has seen constitutional history as an ongoing
narrative. On this view, the state of the law in 1900 provides context, but it is not
an interpretative straitjacket.” 3 01 And even on the orthodox legalist view dominant
prior to the Mason Court, restraint was achieved not through a focus on history —
which is extrinsic and contestable—but by a focus on text and on existing
doctrine.3 0 2 Stare decisis is not a pragmatic exception to Australian legalism but
lies at its core. That is, the view is Burkean, not Scalian.

IV. Six Hypotheses
We have, then, a not insignificant paradox. Many sober and respectable
academic theorists, judges, and ordinary citizens of the United States find
originalism a tidy, even compelling response to the countermajoritarian difficulty.
Yet hardly any sober or respectable foreign nation, our closest cousins included,
boasts a similar mass of opinion in favor of American-style originalism. Even in
other democratic nations with long traditions of constitutional judicial review,
with deep common law roots, and with difficult processes of constitutional
amendment, resistance to judicial activism does not commingle with historical
300
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fetishism. The wisdom of crowds is no help here: it damns equally the notions
that originalism is either uniquely suited to judicial review of a written
constitution in a democracy or is, in short, bunk.3 03
The paradox recommends an answer, namely that the measure of
originalism’s success lies not in originalism but in ourselves. Aspects of our
history and political culture are apt to heighten our sensitivity to the historicist
appeals that characterize the originalism movement of the last three decades. This
Part suggests six hypotheses that help to explain the origins of Our Originalism.
First, I argue that the passage of time, in combination with our revolutionary
history, indoctrinates a filiopietistic attitude toward the founding generation.304
Second, I suggest that our revolutionary political origins also focus constitutional
interpretive attention on that era to an extent not possible in Canada or Australia.
Third, we remain in the grips of an anti-rights backlash that is directly responsive
to the perceived excesses of the Warren Court. Fourth, our public participates
more directly in the selection of judges to the constitutional court than either
Canada’s or Australia’s, which can encourage appeals to populism and
demagoguery. Fifth, relative to Canada (but not Australia) we tend to emphasize a
monolithic vision of the political order that is hospitable to originalism. Finally, a
suspicion of evolution and an embrace of the binding authority of sacred texts is a
prominent feature of our religious culture.
I use the term “origins” guardedly. It is not to be confused with “causes”
or “requisites.” It is worth repeating that this is not a scientific enquiry, and it is
not amenable to the scientific method. The question this Article seeks to answer is
one not of causation but of influence and association. Consider by analogy the
origins of a cold. We may identify risks—insufficient hand -washing; hanging
around toddlers; overexhaustion; and so forth —but the actual operation of the
virus may remain elusive.

A. Fixating on the Framers
In November 2008 the American Constitution Society sponsored a
conference called “The Second Founding and the Reconstruction Amendments:
Toward a More Perfect Union.” The mission statement for the conference
observed that “[i]n current legal debates, many invoke ‘the founding’ of the
Constitution yet focus only on the eighteenth -century framing, and ignore the
significant changes to our country and our Constitution wrought by the Civil
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War.”305 Less charitably, Canadian Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie is said to
have told a New Zealand conference that “the approach of [his] counterparts in
the United States could only be explained by appreciating that Americans were
engaged in a ritual of ancestor worship.”306
It is beyond any doubt that Americans revere the Washingtons, Jeffersons,
Hamiltons, and Madisons of the founding generation. There are many
explanations for this, but one is the passage of time itself. 3 07 That generation
created a nation that, nominally at least, has endured for more than 230 years and
has enabled us to breathe what Charles Black called “the sweet air of
legitimacy.” 3 08 Meese began his July 1985 speech to the ABA with the
declaration that “[w]e Americans rightly pride ourselves on having produced the
greatest political wonder of the world —a government of laws and not of men.”309
Meese’s pride emanates from the durability of the American experiment: The
passage of time canonizes the ideas and historical figures of the founding era. So
Justice Scalia may say, and indeed may believe, that he so frequently refers to The
Federalist because it is emblematic of contemporaneous usage of constitutional
text, but it is more significant that he is availing himself of the rhetorical purchase
the views of Madison, Hamilton , and Jay confer.
As the mission of the Second Founding Conference suggests, American
jurists often emphasize narratives of continuity with the Founding Era even when
Reconstruction narratives of conflict are more compelling. In New York Times v.
Sullivan, for example, the allegedly libelous statements at issue targeted Southern
resistance against the efforts of the civil rights movement to redeem the promise
of the Reconstruction Amendments, and the Fourteenth Amendment is the vehicle
through which the First Amendment applies to the states. Yet the Court made no
305
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reference to Reconstruction, instead resting its historical argument for a
heightened standard for libel of public officials on Madison’s and Jefferson’s
opposition to the Sedition Acts. 310 Grounding the authority of originalism in a
conception of the framers as uniquely “wise and farsighted,” what Michael Dorf
has labeled “heroic originalism,” 311 evokes a certain sense of national pride. As
Vicki Jackson writes, “Given the impoverished discourse and absence of visible
public virtues of self-restraint in today’s national elected politics, a choice that is
expressed as being between the ‘Founding Fathers’ and anyone living today
makes it likely that nostalgia will trump.”312
There are a number of obstacles to peoples of other nations viewing their
framers in this way. For one thing, the constitutions of countries like Germany
and Japan were forcibly imposed from without,3 13 and in the case of Canada and
Australia, the framers were subjects of the British Crown and did not enjoy formal
lawmaking authority. But historical distance itself is also of some consequence.
Those who promote originalism in the United States were not present at the
founding, were not privy to the compromises that generated the Constitution’s
text, and did not know the framers personally. By contrast, many of the current
Justices on the Canadian Supreme Court are old enough to have had personal
relationships with the people who crafted the Charter and find it “hard to imagine
present-day political leaders possessing the unimpeachable political wisdom that
some might be disposed to attribute to more ancient constitution -makers.”314
Recall, for example, the dismissive attitude the Supreme Court of Canada took
toward the drafters of the fundamental justice provision of the Charter in the BC
Motor Vehicle Act Reference.315 Canadian Justices are also able to rely on
contemporaneous knowledge that the Charter was originally expected, by many at
least, to be interpreted progressively. 316 It is more difficult to make originalist
arguments when there is persuasive evidence that the framers were not
originalists.3 17
310

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-77 (1964).
Michael C . Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of
Original Meaning , 85 GEO . L.J. 1765, 1803 -04 (1997).
312
Jackson, supra note 32, at 942.
313
The Allies gave the Germans some latitude in drafting the Basic Law, but latitude is not
autonomy.
314
Bazowski, supra note 170, at 231. Moreover, the federalism disputes that have featured so
prominently in Canadian constitutional law and that gave birth to the living tree metaphor lend
themselves to judicial invention. The overlapping provincial and national heads of jurisdiction
bespeak a fundamental indeterminacy that presents no occasion for reverence.
315
See notes 156-157 , supra.
311

316

See PATR ICK MON AH AN , POL ITICS AND TH E CONS TITU TION : THE CH AR TE R , FEDER AL ISM , AND
SUP REM E COUR T O F C AN AD A 78-82 (1987); Hogg, supra note 72, at 87.
317
Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. RE V. 889
(1985).
THE

56

Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, forthcoming 88 Tex. L. Rev.

It is furthermore difficult to discern, even in principle, who constitute the
framers of the Constitution Act, 1982. Although it is fair to call Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau the most significant motivating force behind Canadian patriation,
the Constitution Act, 1982 itself owes its present form to a series of negotiations
among numerous federal and provincial ministers, a parliamentary committee,
and a multitude of interest groups. “The interests represented covered a wide
spectrum,” Peter Russell writes of this last category. It included “native peoples,
the multicultural community, women, religions, business, labor, the disabled, gays
and lesbians, trees, and a number of civil liberties organizations. Most of those
who appeared pressed for a stronger Charter of Rights, and a number of them
actually saw their ideas adopted.”31 8 The fiction that all of these disparate groups
aligned on a single understanding of much of anything in the Charter is too
fantastic for most judges to entertain, much less those who lived through the
drafting process.
The outright hostility of early Australian justices to references to the
Convention debates might also be explained in part by the fact that they
themselves were participants in those debates. Justice Kirby writes: “They
remembered. They did not need to be reminded, least of all of the words of other
delegates, some of whom they may have held in low regard.” 3 19 Former Chief
Justice Mason observed on the eve of constitutional sovereignty that criticizing
the Constitution as anachronistic—“as a product of the horse and buggy age”—
was a vibrant political strategy in Australia but not in the United States.320 As I
discuss below, that sentiment is no doubt related to the fact that the Australian
Constitution was, in meaningful ways, not fully Australian. But it is also the
product of a particular moment in Australia’s political time.
Our own reverence for the eighteenth -century founding is likewise
temporally contingent. It is worth remembering that much of the twentieth century
was hardly the best of times for the framers of the U.S. Constitution. Scholars
such as Charles Beard and Arthur Schlesinger sought to dismantle the idea that
the framers deserved particular reverence. 321 As Martin Flaherty writes, “For the
Progressives, American constitutional claims were more than erroneous or even
irrelevant. They were deceitful.” 32 2 Reframing the framers as fundamentally
committed to popular sovereignty and classical liberalism, achieved in part
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through the efforts of scholars like Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood and Akhil
Amar, was no doubt helpful to the revitalization of American originalism. 3 23

B. Revolution vs. Evolution
The prime location of the founding generation within the American ethos
has been consecrated not only by time but, of course, by deeds. The dominant
narrative of American constitutionalism is that the sovereignty of the American
people was established through force of arms during the American Revolution
and was consummated through the drafting of an enduring Constitution. That
Constitution is, moreover, both a locus for popular sovereignty and a distinctly
political site for American identity. 32 4 Jed Rubenfeld has contrasted the
“democratic constitutionalism” of the United States with the “international
constitutionalism” of many European states.325 American sovereignty is bound up
with its Constitution, and its national identity is notionally stated in political
rather than ancestral terms.32 6 The revolution that produced that sovereignty and
that political identity is dated.
The absence of a comparable moment of sovereignty has been a source of
considerable angst in Canadian and Australian political and legal circles.
Canadian legal scholar Peter Russell’s book, Constitutional Odyssey: Can
Canadians Become a Sovereign People? , was written in 2004, more than two
decades after, by all appearances, Canada became formally sovereign. Yet,
Canadian sovereignty is an ongoing process that began before 1867 and continues
to this day. Russell begins his book with a quote from a letter written by three of
the fathers of the BNA Act: “It will be observed that the basis of Confederation
now proposed differs from that of the United States in several important
particulars. It does not profess to be derived from the people but would be the
constitution provided by the imperial parliament, thus remedying any defect.”327
Russell later observes that the constitutional vision underlying the BNA Act was
Burkean rather than Lockean. It was conceived “not as a single foundational
document drawn up at a particular point in time containing all of a society’s rules
and principles of government, but as a collection of laws, institutions, and
political practices that have passed the test of time and which have been found to
323
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serve the society’s interests tolerably well.” 328 It was sober rather than airy;
practical rather than aspirational; secular rather than mystical; thick rather than
thin, in the parlance of Mark Tushnet.329 Moreover it was, formally speaking,
British rather than Canadian.330 Such a document is hardly likely to inspire a
popular politics of originalism. 331
Quite the opposite in fact. The living tree analogy was part of Lord
Sankey’s project of freeing the Canadian Parliament from the vise of the Privy
Council. Canadian sovereignty has long been identified with a metaphor of
evolution and growth, as opposed to the “frozen concepts” approach of Lord
Atkin. 3 3 2 The Charter, though righ ts-oriented, continues to be understood in that
spirit. More than just progressive constitutional doctrine, the living tree,
rhetorically, holds out the promise of self -government.
One could tell a similar story about Australia. Its Constitution, though
inspired by a domestic political movement, was negotiated in London and was
formally enacted by the British Parliament. Justice Kirby has said that “[t]wenty
or 30 years ago, especially in legal circles, the ultimate foundation of the
legitimacy and binding force of the Constitution was given, virtually without
dissent, as the Act of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster.”3 33 It should not be
surprising, then, that the Mason Court’s impatience with originalism coincided
with Australian constitutional independence. Writes Mason himself, “[T]he
legislation that terminated Australia’s residual constitutional links with the United
Kingdom . . . now provides a firmer foundation for the view that the status of the
Constitution as a fundamental law springs from the authority of the Australian
people.”33 4
Australia’s discomfort with originalism came far later in time and in far
milder form, of course, than that of the Supreme Court of Canada. For this it is
328
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tempting to blame, inter alia , the relatively diminished role of the Privy Council
in Australia’s inter se affairs, but the story may be more complicated. The
historical Australian Constitution is not wholly without democratic purchase in
Australia. It was drafted and de facto ratified by Australians and, unlike the BNA
Act, was designed to serve as a popular Constitution.335 Its preamble refers to “the
people” of its various states and describes the Commonwealth as
“indissoluble.”336 Like the U.S. Constitution, it was “not merely a text but a
deed—a constituting .”33 7 It might be useful to describe Australia as having not
one but two moments of sovereignty, the first in 1900 and the second in 1986.
The competing narratives of the Gleeson Court were a struggle over which of
these moments deserved the High Court’s fidelity.

C. Rights and the Right
As Part II discusses, the to -do in the United States over originalism is a
temporally-sensitive feature of our politics, raging at opportune moments and
fading away when no longer useful. The present moment arose in part because
many of the politically salient opinions of the Warren and Burger Courts were
individual-rights cases susceptible to critique on originalist grounds. It is difficult
to imagine Justice Scalia and all he represents existing in the absence of Roe v.
Wade, Miranda v. Arizona , Mapp v. Ohio , and like opinions. These opinions
enable him, as Claudius enables Hamlet.
It is also difficult to imagine a comparable movement developing within a
legal culture like Australia’s, whose Constitution lacks a bill of rights. Individual
rights cases acquire a certain visibility that seems less likely to attach to disputes
over, say, the vesting of state law jurisdiction in federal courts.338 Protection of
individual social and political rights also enjoys an obvious compatibility with
theories of constitutional evolution and stands in obvious tension —here,
“incompatibility” would be too strong33 9 —with a commitment to parliamentary
supremacy.
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Australia’s constitutional structure does not, then, encourage a rights
revolution at all, much less an anti-rights backlash. It is nevertheless worth noting
that the most prominent reaffirmations of Australian legalism arose in a posture of
opposition. The Engineers Case was an effort by Justices Isaacs and Higgins to
repudiate decisively the reserved state powers doctrine and the putatively loose
interpretive principles that generated it. And most observers consider the Gleeson
Court a deliberate foil for the perceived excesses of the Mason Court.
Canada’s rights revolution, on the other hand, is more than competitive
with that of the Warren Court.3 40 Negative rights cases brought under the Charter
had a 41 percent success rate from 1982 to 2002 and positive and group rights
cases had a 27 percent success rate.34 1 And although there is evidence within the
Canadian legal academy of nascent unease with living tree interpretation, there is
nothing approaching a serious suggestion of originalism.34 2
There are at least three possible reasons for the relative lack of embrace of
originalism by an anti-rights backlash movement in Canada. First, the Canadian
experience with aggressive rights protection is more recent than that of the United
States. It takes time for a political movement to mobilize, and it takes
considerable effort and imagination for such a movement to mobilize around a set
of interpretive principles. 34 3 As Morton and Knopff write, “The Charter revolution
has unfolded so quickly that it is hard to gain perspective on it.” 34 4
It does not help that the Liberal Party, which unlike its Australian
namesake is politically aligned with the U.S. Democratic Party, controlled the
Canadian government and Canadian judicial appointments from 1993 to 2006,
when many of the most controversial Charter opinions issued. This era of Liberal
Party dominance both stocked the judicial bench with like-minded judges and
may have sapped conservative politics of the intellectual vitality needed to
coalesce around an effective foil to living tree interpretation. Consider also in this
regard the availability of legislative override under section 33, which though
rarely invoked removes a rhetorical arrow from the quiver of the Court’s
opponents.
Second, much of Charter interpretation toils in the vast fields left open by
section 1, the limitations clause.3 45 That section’s text refers to “such limitations
as are justified in a free and democratic society,” not those that are, say,
340
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“consistent with our history and traditions.” An originalist construction of section
1 would therefore be violently atextual. 346 Third, as discussed, the Charter’s
drafting history itself suggests an expectation of progressive interpretation.3 47
It bears mention, finally, that the an ti-rights orientation of American
originalism also relates significantly to its aggrandizement of the American
Founding. A constitutional jurisprudence whose essential point of reference postdates World War II is more likely to view excessive positivism with suspicion.348
Proponents of that jurisprudence are also more likely to express discomfort with,
and to be suspicious of, the perceived failure of American originalists to
recognize the limitations of positivism confirmed by the European experience.
Originalism is associated with the American right and with a constitutionalism
that much of the world has no desire to emulate. 349

D. The Politics of Judicial Nominations
The entry for Bork, v. —“to defame or vilify (a person) systematically, esp.
in the mass media, usually with the aim of preventing his or her appointment to
public office; to obstruct or thwart (a person) in this way”—first appeared in the
Oxford English Dictionary in 2002. 35 0 Robert Bork’s 1987 Supreme Court
confirmation hearing was a media and interest-group frenzy the likes of which the
United States had not known before but has known several times since. The ritual
wherein Court nominees are meticulously demolished by partisans over several
months, brought before television cameras to parry the stylized soliloquies of
Judiciary Committee members, and condemned or praised by literally hundreds of
interest groups is a familiar feature of our judicial politics. 351 It has become
typical for the public interrogation of a Supreme Court nominee to include
extensive discussion of his or her “judicial philosophy.”35 2 Abetted by this
346
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349
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process, constitutional methodology, and originalism in particular, has become a
site for popular political mobilization.35 3
This rite is unknown to Canada or Australia. In neither country does the
national Parliament have any formal role in the nomination of high court justices
and in neither country has the nomination process been remotely as politicized as
it is in the United States. By comparison to the United States, nominations are
low-visibility events in both countries. Justices are selected by the ruling
government against background norms of qualification for the position.3 54 Writes
Peter Hogg of the situation in Canada, “[S]uccessive governments have evidently
concluded that it is good politics to make good appointments, and the quality of
appointments is generally agreed to be high. There has never been any serious
suggestion that Canadian governments have attempted to ‘pack’ the court with
judges of a particular approach or ideology.” 355
There have been intermittent calls for a broader public discussion of
Supreme Court nominees in Canada, and the 2006 appointment of Marshall
Rothstein to the Court featured the first public interview process for a high court
nominee in Canada. Even then, though, Justice Rothstein’s hearing before an ad
hoc parliamentary committee was barely three hours long and betrayed not a hint
of acrimony.356 The future of even this low level of public participation in the
nomination process is unclear. When Justice Bastarache’s resignation created a
vacancy on the Court in 2008, Prime Minister Harper unceremoniously selected
Thomas Cromwell without adhering to the quasi-public process Harper himself
had earlier endorsed.3 5 7 As one columnist writes, “[w]henever someone suggests
that . . . we ought to have some kind of a public discussion about the kinds of
views and philosophies we want on the bench, the idea is immediately batted
down. Too American.” 35 8
In Australia, too, there have long been calls to bring more “transparency”
and “accountability” to the judicial nomination process, but even critics of the
process concede that “governments have usually exercised this power with due
353
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care and regard for the Court, including that it be composed of the best legal talent
and that it be able to maintain public confidence in the administration of
justice.” 35 9 The grass is always greener indeed.
I have argued elsewhere that the originalism movement is a populist one.
It flaunts originalism’s elegance; the simplicity with which it may be explained to
non-professional audiences; its neutering of the decisionmaking authority of legal
elites; and its fundamentally nationalist orientation.360 In the United States, the
judicial nomination process is the most prominent site at which that set of ethical
values is transcribed onto judicial practice. 36 1 Even if the same set of ethical
values has purchase in Canada or Australia, the absence of public involvement in
judicial selection deprives domestic politics of a prime opportunity to tie those
values to originalism.

E. Pluralism and Nomos
American originalism is radically jurispathic. The term is Robert Cover’s,
and he used it to refer to the role of the court as a suppressant of law. Law in this
sense is not, or rather is not only, the rules that the state is prepared to enforce
through violence, but refers to a legal meaning particular to a community’s
normative universe, or nomos.3 62 Cover said that courts arise out of “the need to
suppress law, to choose between two or more laws, to impose upon laws a
hierarchy. It is the multiplicity of laws, the fecundity of the jurisgenerative
principle, that creates the problem to which the court and the state are the
solution.”3 63
Constitutional interpretation, even as judicially enforced, can seek to
preserve a space for multiple nomoi to coexist. Constitutional principles may be
understood to have meanings that are not fixed in time but evolve through higherorder social and political competition.364 Constitutional law as enforced by the
state may be understood, then, as distinct from what the Constitution means. In
other work I have referred to this distinction as “thin” versus “thick”
constitutional law: Because not all constitutional law is equally shared, not all
359
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constitutional law is equally stable. 3 65 A little instability in constitutional law
preserves a space for competing constitutional narratives to breathe that sweet air
of legitimacy.
Originalism generally rejects all I have just said. Indeed, it is chiefly
promoted as the most effective means of establishing the falsity of competing
narratives. Original understanding is a criterion for what the law is that is thought
to frustrate the social and political capture of judges. The chief lament of many of
the Australian judges in Pierce’s study is telling: “[T]here was a certainty about
law fifty years ago which most practitioners would tell you is now absent.”
“There was a conscious jettisoning [by the Mason Court] of the notion that
certainty is the object of the legal system.” “The High Court itself has been very
active in recent years . . . some would say overactive to the extent there has been
an element of instability infused in some areas of the law which is perhaps felt to
be undesirable.” 3 6 6 For law to hold out the possibility of capture is bound to create
uncertainty and instability, but for many marginalized communities it is what
makes the legal language game worth playing. 36 7
A constitutional interpretive methodology designed to suppress competing
narratives is a poor fit for Charter interpretation and for Canada’s national ethos
more generally. In particular, accommodation of the interests of the Québécois
was a precondition to federation and is expressed in numerous Charter provisions,
and the ongoing tension surrounding Canada’s fundamental heterogeneity has
produced several constitutional crises over the last three decades. The Charter
itself guarantees a number of express rights to language minorities; 3 68 guarantees
the right to travel; 3 69 protects the rights of aboriginal peoples, including treaty
rights;37 0 grants rights to sectarian schools;3 71 and requires that the Charter “be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the
multicultural heritage of Canadians.”37 2 The very existence of the federal
365

See Greene, supra note 1, at 700.
PIERCE , supra note 237, at 48.
367
See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,
22 HARV . C.R.-C.L. L. RE V. 401 (1987). Jerome Frank suggested, controversially, that in craving
certainty in the law we yearn for an “incomparable, omnipotent, infallible father” who can assert a
form of parental control over the chaos life invariably presents. JEROM E FR ANK , L AW AND THE
MODERN MIND 14-23, 20 (1930). For many women, blacks, immigrants, gays, and members of
other historical out groups, the “Founding Fathers” to which originalists turn for certainty not only
do not look like their fathers, but symbolize a hostile, even genocidal, social order. The objection
to originalism here differs from the standard “dead hand” critique: the founding era is deficient not
just in failing to fully represent but in failing to universally resonate or pacify.
368
Charter of Rights and Freedoms §§ 16-23.
369
Id . § 6.
370
Id . §§ 25, 35.
371
Id . § 29.
372
Id . § 27.
366

65

Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, forthcoming 88 Tex. L. Rev.

Department of Canadian Heritage suggests a certain insecurity about Canada’s
cultural unity, and as to assuage any suggested affinity for hegemony, the
Department states its “strategic outcomes” in full as “Canadians express and share
their diverse cultural experiences with each other and the world,” and “Canadians
live in an inclusive society built on intercultural understanding and citizen
participation.” 373 Québec in fact still has not ratified the Charter, and efforts to
institute reforms that would bring Québec fully into the national fold have
failed. 3 7 4 Canadians have never quite been one people, and the Charter has not
succeeded in its lofty though necessarily half -hearted ambition to make them
so.375
To be sure, the same could be said of Americans, but not so fast. The
United States has no significant separatist movement, its aboriginal population is
much smaller than Canada’s,376 and its minority populations are, ironically
perhaps, insufficiently insular to enjoy political power comparable to that of the
Québécois.3 77 It is easier for an assimilationist ethic to flourish in the United
States—or in Australia, for that matter37 8 —than in Canada. Public values surveys
conducted by the research firm Environics throughout the 1990s show the number
of Canadians who said they “relate to nonconformists” remaining consistently at
two-thirds, but the number of Americans who said the same dropping from 64
percent in 1992 to 52 percent in 2000. 379 During the same period, the number of
Canadians agreeing that “[n]on -whites should not be allowed to immigrate to this
country” rose from 11 percent to 13 percent, while in the United States it rose
from 16 percent to 25 percent. 380
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The U.S. Constitution is an important conduit for American assimilation:
the dominant domestic narrative, part of the legacy of Brown v. Board of
Education , remains that separate is inherently unequal. 38 1 But the ethic extends
beyond race. Justice Scalia is conspicuously fond of relying upon it in
constitutional cases. His spirited dissent in the VMI case quoted approvingly the
school’s Code of a Gentleman and praised the “manly ‘honor’” the school
instilled in students through its single -sex, military -style indoctrination.382 In a
recent case considering whether the Ten Commandments could be posted in a
courthouse, Justice Scalia suggested that public acknowledgement of the Ten
Commandments is distinguishable from government endorsement of religion on
the grounds, in part, that 97.7 percent of Americans practice monotheistic
faiths. 3 83 It was the very commitment to equality as against appreciation of
difference that Justice Scalia cited in rejecting the claim of a Native American to
constitutional protection of his peyote use in Employment Division v. Smith .384
Consider also Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerard
D., in which the Court refused to extend visitation rights to the biological father of
a child born to a woman married to another man.38 5 Justice Scalia denied the
claim to constitutional protection of the out-of-wedlock relationship between the
petitioner and the mother in part on the ground that it has not “been treated as a
protected family unit under the historical practices of our society.” 386 Criticizing
Justice Scalia’s reliance on tradition, Justice Brennan wrote in dissent:
In construing the Fourteenth Amendment to offer shelter only to
those interests specifically protected by historical practice, . . . the
plurality ignores the kind of society in which our Constitution exists. We
are not an assimilative, homogenous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic
one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else’s unfamiliar or
even repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own
idiosyncracies. 387
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Justice Brennan identified a set of fault lines often neglected in interpretive
debates. Originalists tend to disfavor particularized claims of right and seek to
conform our constitutional history to that posture.
F. Constitutional Faith
The living tree metaphor is not unique to Canadian law. Elliot Dorf and
Arthur Rosett have emphasized that Jewish law is distinct from biblical law
insofar as, although based on the Bible, it has evolved “through interpretation,
legislation, and custom.”38 8 They write: “The rabbis of the classical tradition
claimed that their interpretations were the new form of God’s revelation,
replacing visions and voices. Those features of Jewish law proclaim loudly that it
is intended to be a law for all generations, and so Jews have lived it.” 389 It is in
part for this reason that Jewish law has been compared within that classical
tradition to a “living tree.” 3 90 The analogy derives from the Book of Proverbs:
I give you good instruction; never forsake My Torah.
It is a tree of life, for those who hold fast to it, and those who uphold
it are happy.
Its ways are pleasant, and all its paths are peace. 391
As we have seen, the dichotomy between revelation and interpretation recurs in
debates over the authority of statutory and constitutional text as originally enacted
and understood. Justice Kirby equates British statutory interpretation with the
notion that judges “had to find their authority in a text of the law, just as the new
bishops after the Reformation were expected to find theirs in the text of
Scripture.” 39 2 It was not only “very English” but “very Protestant” to “demand
fidelity to the text so as to curb the inventions and pretensions to unwarranted
power.”393
As Jaroslav Pelikan notes in his insightful comparison of biblical and
constitutional interpretation, the first of Martin Luther’s Ninety -Five Theses—
“Our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, when He said Poenitentiam agite, willed that
the whole life of believers should be repentance”394 —is no less than “an appeal
388
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from the current teaching and practice of the church to the original intent and
sensus literalis of the Gospels.”395 The point here is that the “original,
grammatical meaning of the Scripture” commands a devotion to a life of
repentance, not the performance of penance, or “the ritual of contrition,
confession, and satisfaction” commanded by the Roman Catholic Church. Luther
was appealing to the original meaning of the text rather than the scriptural
decision rule crafted by the Church.396
There are numerous reasons to think this dichotomy liable to concretize
within the American imagination. The American attitude toward the Constitution
is frequently described in terms of worship, reverence, and fidelity. 39 7 Max Lerner
once described the Constitution as America’s “totem and its fetish.” He wrote:
In fact the very habits of mind begotten by an authoritarian Bible
and a religion of submission to a higher power have been carried over to
an authoritarian Constitution and a philosophy of submission to a “higher
law;” and a country like America, in which its early tradition had
prohibited a state church, ends by getting a state church after all, although
in a secular form. 3 98
On this conception the difficulty of constitutional amendment through Article V,
which could theoretically argue in favor of evolutionary interpretation by judges,
instead facilitates the iconography of the Constitution as a sacred text. What
395

JAR OSL AV PEL IK AN , IN TERP RETING TH E BIB LE & THE CONS TITU TION 100 (2004).
Id . at 100 -01.
397
MICH AEL K AM M EN , A M ACH INE TH AT WOULD GO OF ITSELF : THE CON S TITU TION IN
AM ER IC AN CUL TU RE 225 (1986); J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our
Faith , 65 FORDHAM L. RE V. 1703 (1997); Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument and
as Symbol, 6 AM . POLIT. SC I. RE V. 1071 (1936); See generally SANFORD LE VINSON ,
CONSTITU TION AL F AITH (1988). Henry Monaghan’s critique of substantive due process
proponents as advocating a “perfect” constitution begins by quoting an emblematic if not quite
characteristic indulgence:
Our great and sacred Constitution, serene and inviolable, stretches its beneficent powers
over our land . . . like the outstretched arm of God himself . . . the people of the United
States . . . ordained and established one Supreme Court—the most rational, considerate,
discerning, veracious, impersonal power—the most candid, unaffected, conscientious,
incorruptible power. . . . O Marvelous Constitution! Magic Parchment! Transforming
word! Maker, Monitor, Guardian of Mankind!
Monaghan, supra note 160, at 353 (quoting Henry R. Estabrook, Proceedings of the Annual
Meeting of the Missouri Bar 278 (1913), quoted in RALP H HENRY G ABRIEL , THE COUR T OF
AM ER IC AN DEM OCR ATIC THOUGH T 402 (1940))
398
Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294-95 (1937); see also
PELIK AN , supra note 395, at 7 (“With the reduction in the private authority of Chirstian Scripture,
and especially in its public authority, American Scripture has been called upon to fill some of the
gap.”).
396

69

Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, forthcoming 88 Tex. L. Rev.

Ackerman calls constitutional moments Scalia might call apocrypha, as far as
their authority over him extends. Add to this broth the evangelical movement,
which generally favors literal interpretation of the Bible—that is, according to the
author’s original semantic intention 399 —and which is, relatedly or not, suspicious
of metaphors of evolution, and the relative popularity of originalism in the United
States begins to look less mysterious.4 00
Consider the religious makeup of each of the countries we have studied.
Roughly half of all Americans self-identify as Protestant, roughly half of that
number self-identifies as evangelical Protestant, and roughly four in ten
Americans say they attend church weekly.401 Half of American evangelicals—the
most of any religious group surveyed —believe that there is “only one true way to
interpret the teachings of my religion.”40 2 Evangelicalism is far less prevalent in
Canada and Australia. Less than a quarter of the population of either country is
Protestant, only eight percent of Canadians identify as evangelical, and more than
15 percent of the population of each country has no religious belief at all. 403 By
contrast only five percent of U.S. adults report that they are atheist or agnostic.404
Although both Canada and Australia have larger Roman Catholic populations
than the United States, Catholic biblical interpretation is traditionally eclectic and
purposive rather than dogmatic and strictly textualist. 4 05
Restoration and redemption are, as Jack Balkin writes, “the key tropes of
constitutional interpretation by social movements and political parties.”406
Successful claims on the meaning of the Constitution call for either a “return to
the enduring principles of the Constitution” or “fulfillment of those principles.”407
As a traditionally restorative modality, originalism might be viewed as a secular
corollary to “the fall” in Christian theology. In the originalist narrative the
399
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founding era is a prelapsarian state, a pure source of constitutional meaning and
legal authority. Originalism promises a return to this state and a cleansing of the
corrupting influence of unelected judges over constitutional law. 408
***
The six hypotheses just sketched are interrelated. One could as easily state
them as a single hypothesis with multiple elements: The United States is a country
with a large evangelical population and in which much of the population holds a
reverential attitude toward the Constitution and toward the war heroes who forged
it. That Constitution is a source of political identity for many Americans, and as a
symbol of American sovereignty it is a potent reference for narratives of both
restoration and redemption.40 9 The rights revolution of the Warren and Burger
Courts led to a conservative backlash that, owing in part to the public nature of
the judicial nomination process, was able to frame its critique through the medium
of constitutional interpretive methodology. Thus a particular orientation combined
with a particular objective and an opportunity to create an originalism
“movement” that has no parallel in either Canada or Australia.
The direction of causation in this story is concededly enigmatic. Sustained
glorification of originalist interpretive methods might well have backwash effects
that serve to reinforce our reverence for the founding generation or even perhaps
our affinity for literalism in biblical exegesis. I do not, moreover, wish to
minimize the significance and the agency of a motivated social and political
movement in the proliferation of originalism in the United States. I may have
identified factors that have led us to the waters of originalism, but only a
committed movement can force us to drink.
What I do wish to deny is that the failure of originalism to spread to
Canada, or of more historicist originalism to spread to Australia, is or can be
attributed to simple lack of effort or internal persuasiveness. Originalism and
historicism are socially embedded and culturally contingent. 41 0 Their success
requires not just an argument, or even one coupled with a movement, but also an
audience sensitized by culture and by history.

V. Originalism as Ethical Argument
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When Justice Hugo Black delivered the inaugural James Madison lectures
at New York University School of Law in 1960, he began his speech by
recounting Madison’s role in the founding of the nation. Madison, he said, “lived
in the stirring times between 1750 and 1836, during which the Colonies declared,
fought for, and won their independence from England.” Black said that the
government those colonists set up was “dedicated to Liberty and Justice,” and
said that because of Madison’s outsized role as “the Father of our Constitution,”
his words “are an authentic source to help us understand the Constitution and its
Bill of Rights.” 41 1
In the lecture that followed that eulogistic introduction, Black offered his
well-known theory on the first ten amendments to the Constitution, that “there are
‘absolutes’ in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose by men
who knew what words meant, and meant their prohibitions to be ‘absolutes.’”412
As Charles Black has observed, it seems that Justice Black cannot have meant
what he said.41 3 It cannot be that Congress truly can make no law abridging the
freedom of speech, and Justice Black, a deceptively learned man, must have
known that. Professor Black seeks to rescue his eponymous contemporary with
something of a lawyer’s trick: even on Justice Black’s view, freedom of speech
remains to be defined, and the same sort of balancing Justice Black criticizes in
his opponents he himself may employ in deciding in the first instance what that
freedom entails. 414 The difference, then, between Justice Black and his
adversaries is not in their relative commitments to the Constitution but in what
Professor Black calls “attitude.” 41 5 A posture of absolutism is a prophylaxis
against dilution of our constitutional rights.
In Justice Black’s hands, originalist argument was, sub silentio , an
argument about the sort of attitude judges should take toward the Constitution.
For Justice Black, that attitude was deeply informed by the lessons of American
history. In the Madison lectures he articulated his own version of the fall:
Today most Americans seem to have forgotten the ancient evils
which forced their ancestors to flee to this new country and to form a
government stripped of old powers used to oppress them. But the
Americans who supported the Revolution and the adoption of our
Constitution knew firsthand the dangers of tyrannical governments. They
were familiar with the long existing practice of English persecutions of
411
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people wholly because of their religious or political beliefs. They knew
that many accused of such offenses had stood, helpless to defend
themselves, before biased legislators and judges.416
Black is storytelling. He is using anecdote to evoke feelings of nostalgia,
patriotism, and pride in favor of an attitude of caution and prophylaxis toward
judicial authority to determine the scope of constitutional rights. This way of
arguing about methodology is available to him because of the passage of time and
the historical and cultural moment the Revolution represents in the American
imagination. Writing at the height of the Cold War and less than a generation
removed from World War II, Black’s narrative is less populist than Justice
Scalia’s—it instead is anti-statist, rights-friendly, less suspicious of difference,
and focused on concepts like liberty and justice—but it is no less American.
Constitutional theory has a name for this style of argument, and it isn’t
originalism. In 1982 Philip Bobbitt articulated a typology of constitutional
argument that has become familiar to legal academics. Bobbitt divided
constitutional argument into six modalities: historical, textual, structural,
prudential, doctrinal, and ethical. 417 Originalism is typically associated with his
first kind of argument, historical, but this Article suggests that it is also associated
with his last kind, ethical. Ethical argument represents “constitutional argument
whose force relies on a characterization of American institutions and the role
within them of the American people.” On Bobbitt’s account, such arguments
advance “the character, or ethos, of the American polity” as legal authority.418
Bobbitt concluded that a surprising range of decisions employ primarily ethical
argument—from the Cherokee Cases to Trop v. Dulles to the Pentagon Papers
Case, among others.41 9
More interestingly for our purposes, Bobbitt also seemed to recognize
implicitly that historical argument is, in important ways, ethical. In critiquing an
originalist position, Bobbitt relied on the familiar argument that it is difficult to
imagine what members of the founding generation would have thought about how
to apply the general principles of the Constitution to modern issues. Such
imagining, he says:
depends also on assumptions about intention, but in a peculiar
way: that the whole life of an eighteenth -century agrarian society should
govern us since the Founders were of that special day and that we, from
our very different lives, can know what those people would have thought
416
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in situations within which they would have been, of course, very different
people. It is easy to see that such arguments are better for dissent than for
the Court because . . . they express a particular moral point and are
therefore more effective as rhetoric than as decision procedure.420
Though Bobbitt does not say so, he is describing a form of ethical argument. The
rhetoric upon which originalist arguments rely, often successfully, is driven by a
narrative about the American ethos.4 21 Originalist arguments help to construct and
then embed themselves within “the community’s self-conception of its values and
commitments, and the stories that it tells about itself to itself.” 42 2 Much more than
textual, structural, doctrinal, or prudential argument, historical argument in the
United States is about storytelling.
That was difficult to recognize—if it was true at all—before historical
argument in the United States became so self-referential. As Bork and Scalia have
noted, there was a time when it was unusual for American judges to suggest any
alternative to originalism.423 But in the great battles between Black and
Frankfurter and Breyer and Scalia, the originalist position has indeed become as
much “ rhetoric as decision procedure.” When multiple modalities are made
available and become the subject of judicial discussion, there develop conventions
for choosing among them. Put differently, there are modalities for choosing
modalities.
The scope of conventional argument about modality is easier to see in
Canada and Australia, the high courts of which are more self-conscious about
interpretation than is our own. The argument for living tree interpretation in
Canada is partly doctrinal, relying expressly on the Persons Case. One could
advance a persuasive textual argument that the Supreme Court of Canada should
interpret section 1 of the Charter through an evolutionary modality. The argument
for legalism in Australia was doctrinal prior to the Mason Court, based on the
Engineers Case, but under the Gleeson Court it was perhaps better characterized
as prudential, designed to impart needed certainty upon judicial decisionmaking.
The practice of constitutional law is the practice of making a set of arguments, but
it is as much the practice of arguing about how to choose among those arguments.
Recognizing that originalist argument in the United States is ultimately
ethical should give pause both to originalists and to their detractors. For some
420
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originalists, the recognition is self -defeating. Originalism is valuable to many
originalists precisely because its source of legal authority is not inherently
contested. Ethical argument is an ideological approach to interpretation, not in the
sense that it is partisan , but in the sense that it is socially constructed; originalists
generally reject ideological approaches in either sense. The narratives originalists
rely upon are imagined to emerge from analysis rather than advocacy.4 24 But if the
choice of a historical modality is culturally dependent, conventional legal analysis
cannot be authoritative on its own; it must always be connected to a story about
what kind of people we are.
Nonoriginalists have been on the defensive of late. This Article’s
observations are reason for optimism and caution alike. Recall, from Part IV, the
framing of originalism’s template in terms of three “o’s”: orientation, objective,
and opportunity.4 25 It will be fruitful to discuss them in reverse. The opportunity
for political progressives to construct an alternative program framed in
methodological terms is riper than it has been in some time. Barack Obama was
elected with a larger popular vote share than any first-term Democrat since
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932, and he began his presidency with large
majorities in both houses of Congress. The judicial nomination process remains
vulnerable to populist appeals, but in an era of deep economic uncertainty it is far
from clear that such appeals still align comfortably with conservative politics.
The notes of caution relate to the other two “o’s”: objective and
orientation. The originalism movement is connected to a set of political
commitments. We need not guess at what those commitments are. The Reagan
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Policy produced a document in 1988
entitled “The Constitution in the Year 2000: Choices Ahead in Constitutional
Interpretation.” The document proclaimed itself designed to identify the stakes of
the “judicial philosophies” of the judges appointed to the Supreme Court. The
claimed results dictated by an originalist view of the Constitution aligned nicely
with the Republican political program of the 1980s: restrictions on abortion rights,
gay rights, immigrant rights, and affirmative action, and protections for private
discrimination, school prayer, state autonomy, and property rights.426 We can now
add gun rights to that program, although resurrection of the Second Amendment
was not a mainstream view in the 1980s. 427 Originalism does not obviously
produce some of those positions—restrictions on affirmative action, for
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example—but originalism was a means of casting many of them in putatively
neutral terms and therefore branding the agenda as a whole as consistent with
constitutional fidelity.428 No similarly coherent political program has emerged
from the left. It will be difficult for progressives to formulate an effective
response to originalism without reaching general consensus on a policy agenda
that the response is designed to promote.
More attention will have to be paid, moreover, to the first “o ,” orientation.
This Article has sought to demonstrate that originalism is attractive to many
Americans in part because of our orientation toward the founding generation,
toward assimilation and individualized claims of right, and toward secular
approaches to interpretation of sacred texts. These orientations are slow to evolve,
and seem to accommodate originalism better than some of its more dynamic
competitors. As I have emphasized, however, orientations lie dormant without a
corresponding narrative, and the narratives that connect us to these originalism friendly orientations are contestable.
Significantly, the American polity may be increasingly susceptible to a
pluralist narrative. If current immigration and demographic patterns hold, the U.S.
Census Bureau projects that the United States will be majority -minority by the
year 2042. 42 9 As the nation diversifies culturally, narratives of assimilation may
become less fecund and the unifying potential of founding era mythology may
diminish. The symbolism of that era may not resonate equally across a range of
communities, and to the extent that it does resonate, it may do so increasingly as a
source of redemption rather than restoration. Claims that extend beyond equal
status to equal respect or even affirmative appreciation of difference may become
more prevalent and politically powerful. 430
Technological change, which allows communities of interest to form
across geographic space, also may facilitate a relative shift in favor of pluralist
narratives. Immigrant rights, rights for gay, lesbian, and transgendered
individuals, rights for the disabled, and less punitive approaches to criminal
behavior might all benefit from a renewed emphasis on the American orientation
towards accommodation of difference. 431 Jurispathic certitude in law may become
relatively disfavored as a result; the most potent constitutional metaphor may
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trend away from the tablets of the covenant and toward, say, open -source
software.
A second possibility is that the financial crisis of 2008 could, with
sufficient emphasis, prompt a revitalization of a welfare-oriented
constitutionalism. 43 2 Comparisons between Obama and Roosevelt should not be
lost on those who seek to shift the focus of originalism away from the founding
generation, for the appropriate era to mine for inspiration may be the New Deal
rather than Reconstruction.4 33 Freedom from want remains the most neglected of
Roosevelt’s four freedoms; the time may be ripe to resurrect Roosevelt’s Second
Bill of Rights, which called for a fierce political commitment to a living wage,
freedom from unfair competition, home ownership, health care, education, and
recreation. That is a remarkably plausible progressive policy platform for the
current time. It is, moreover, a platform easily adaptable to representation
reinforcement, to the Reconstruction -oriented originalism of Justice Black, or
even, in this Democratic era, to a minimalist or prudentialist approach to
constitutional interpretation. What is needed are storytellers; simply mouthing the
words “living this” or “living that” will not do. Too Canadian.

VI. Conclusion
Originalism, like any other species of legal practice, is environmentally
adaptive. The variations in practices of constitutional interpretation that we
observe across space and time may be explained by variations in the political,
cultural, and historical landscape in which those practices are situated. That may
seem obvious, but it is in tension with the view that originalism follows inevitably
from the act of judicial interpretation of a written constitution. I hope to have
demonstrated not only that that view is unlikely to be true but also that a long
tradition of judicial review, difficulty of constitutional amendment, a familiarity
with common law adjudication, and a desire to avoid judicial activism do not add
up to an affinity for originalism. We share those conditions with Canada and with
Australia, and in both countries the sorts of interpretive moves that enjoy
rhetorical potency are quite different from here. That is not for lack of exposure to
the originalist argument as it has been expressed in the United States; rather, it
results, I suggest, from a different historical orientation toward the Constitution, a
different place in domestic political time, a different approach to judicial
selection, and a different set of cultural and religious predicates.
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In exposing these variations in practice and proposing a set of explanatory
influences I hope not only to have demystified originalism but also to have
gestured at a different frame of mind in constitutional interpretive discourse.
Originalism has been relatively successful in the United States because its
proponents have related it to an account of constitutional authority that resonates
with the American people. It has not been successful in Canada because no
comparable narrative is available. It has taken a different form in Australia
because Australians necessarily tell a different set of stories about their
constitutional history and the role of the judiciary in enforcing constitutional
mandates. Interpretive constitutional arguments, like substantive ones, are
arguments about democratic culture. The effectiveness of arguments for or against
one or another method of interpretation will depend not on whether the arguments
are logically coherent but on whether they are ours.
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